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ity
ABSTRACT
We propose a new, price-based measure of information risk called abnormal idiosyncratic
volatility (AIV ) that captures information asymmetry faced by uninformed investors. AIV is
the idiosyncratic volatility prior to information events in excess of normal levels. Using earn-
ings announcements as information events, we show that AIV is positively associated with
informed return run-ups, abnormal insider trading, short selling, and institutional trading
during pre-earnings-announcement periods. We find that stocks with high AIV earn eco-
nomically and statistically larger future returns than stocks with low AIV . Taken together,
our findings support the notion that information risk is priced.
Keywords: Information risk; Idiosyncratic volatility; Earnings announcement, Expected re-
turns
JEL Classification Number: G00, G12, G14
1. Introduction
Standard asset pricing theory posits that expected asset returns are related to their co-
variances with systematic factors under the assumption that information is homogeneous for
all investors. When information is asymmetric across investors, the question of how asset
prices and expected returns are determined is theoretically challenging. Different model as-
sumptions lead to different predictions, and technical difficulties hinder a complete analysis.1
Empirically, the question of whether the risk of information asymmetry is priced in asset
returns is far from settled, although many studies have investigated this topic. The primary
difficulty is related to the lack of proper measures of information risk. Thus, in this paper, we
explore the pricing of information risk by constructing a price-based measure of information
risk.
In the previous literature, the most prominent measures of information risk are based
on trading quantities.2 Easley et al. (1996) and Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002;
hereafter EHO) develop a microstructure model and use order flow to estimate the probability
of informed trading (PIN). Due to difficulties in computing PIN under high-frequency
trading, Easley, Lopez de Prado, and O’Hara (2012) develop a new procedure to overcome
flow toxicity, the volume-synchronized probability of informed trading. Instead of using all
transactions, Hwang and Qian (2011) construct an information risk measure based on large
trades. More recently, Choi, Jin, and Yan (2016) use prior weekly institutional ownership
volatility to proxy for information risk. Although these quantity-based measures are shown to
be positively related to expected future stock returns, the pricing evidence is also challenged
1Wang (1993) notes that the role of information asymmetry in the risk premium is indeterminate because
the amount of information impounded in an asset price changes with changes in information asymmetry.
Easley and O’Hara (2004) demonstrate that information risk is priced because uninformed investors are
always on the wrong side of the trade, whereas Hughes, Liu, and Liu (2007) show that the pricing impact
of asset-specific private information goes to zero as the number of assets increases. See also Garleanu
and Pedersen (2004) and Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007) for conditions under which information
asymmetry affects asset pricing.
2There are also alternative measures of information risk based on firm characteristics such as firm size,
earnings quality, and analyst coverage. In addition, there is an interesting study by Kelly and Ljungqvist
(2012) that uses three natural experiments to test the pricing of information risk.
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in the literature (Duarte and Young, 2009; hereafter DY; Lai, Ng, and Zhang, 2014; Chung
and Huh, 2016).
We begin with the assumption that information risk is multifaceted; as such, it is unlikely
that quantity-based measures can capture information risk in all its aspects (e.g., Odders-
White and Ready, 2008; Kim and Stoll, 2014; Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan, 2016;
Back, Crotty, and Li, 2018; Duarte, Hu, and Young, 2017). In principle, an informed trading
equilibrium incorporates both quantity and price. By inferring informed trading from price
variation, we construct an information risk measure called abnormal idiosyncratic volatility
(AIV ), which is the idiosyncratic volatility before an information-intensive event in excess
of the idiosyncratic volatility of the normal period. The literature has long recognized that
information flow is reflected in idiosyncratic volatility (e.g., Roll, 1988; Morck, Yeung, and
Yu, 2000; Durnev, Morck, and Yeung, 2004; Ferreira and Laux, 2007; Dang, Moshirian,
and Zhang, 2015). However, idiosyncratic volatility may reflect other features of firms such
as fundamental risk and investors’ overreaction to firm-specific information (e.g., Wei and
Zhang, 2006; Teoh, Yang, and Zhang, 2007; Zhang, 2010; Hou, Peng, and Xiong, 2013).
Therefore, AIV is employed to tease out unusual price variations caused by trading activities
related to information-intensive events.
We estimateAIV as the difference in idiosyncratic volatility between pre-earnings-announcement
and non-earnings-announcement periods. Earnings announcements are selected in this study
as the information-intensive event for several reasons. First, earnings announcements are the
most value-relevant information events that firms use to reveal their past profitability and
to help investors project their future performance (Beyer et al., 2010). Second, informed
trading is pervasive prior to earnings announcements (Krinsky and Lee, 1996; Kim and
Verrecchia, 1997; Vega, 2006; Bamber, Barron, and Stevens, 2011; Brennan, Huh, and Sub-
rahmanyam, 2016; Back, Crotty, and Li, 2018). Third, beginning in 1970, the Securities and
Exchange Commission has mandated quarterly reporting for all exchange-listed firms in the
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US. Therefore, estimating AIV is feasible for all stocks over the sample period.3
Using both annual and quarterly earnings announcements, we estimate AIV for stocks
listed on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq over the 43-year period from 1972 to 2015. We
perform the following analyses. First, because it is well documented in the literature that
corporate insiders, short sellers, and institutional traders are informed traders, we link AIV
to their trading activities to determine whether it captures informed trading. Indeed, we find
positive relations between AIV and abnormal insider trading, abnormal short selling, and
abnormal institutional trading during the pre-earnings-announcement periods. We further
show a positive relation between AIV and the magnitude of informed return run-ups prior
to earnings announcements, which suggests that these investors are truly informed about
upcoming earnings announcements for stocks with high AIV . We also validate negative
AIV and show that stocks with negative AIV indeed have a lower level of information risk.
We finally find that as a measure of information risk, AIV may not be as persistent as firm
characteristics.
Second, we explore whether the information risk captured by AIV is priced. Using
portfolio and regression analyses, we find that high-AIV firms tend to have high future
stock returns. Moreover, the pricing of AIV is more pronounced for, but not limited to,
small stocks. A trading strategy combining a long position in a high-AIV quintile portfolio
with a short position in a low-AIV quintile portfolio generates a 1.90% risk-adjusted annual
return.4 The spread return increases to 4.08% if the long-short strategy is applied to the
smallest size quintile. The pricing of AIV is also evidenced in the regression method of Fama
and MacBeth (1973), with other well-known pricing factors controlled for. The pricing of
3The disadvantage of focusing solely on earnings announcements is that many other corporate events
also contain information about firm value, and excluding these corporate events makes the information risk
measure noisier because many of these events are conducted during non-earnings-announcement periods. We
view the work documented in this paper as the first step in eventually achieving a full-blown measure of
information risk. In spite of this disadvantage, we also note that the results presented in this paper are strong
enough to demonstrate that a price-based information risk measure adds value to quantity-based measures
of information risk.
4We annualize the risk-adjusted return for the ease of comparison with other studies such as momentum
by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and idiosyncratic volatility anomaly by Ang et al. (2006, 2009). To achieve
such return, the portfolio has to be rebalanced monthly.
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AIV is robust to the exclusion of inactive or penny stocks, different measurement windows
of pre-earnings-announcement periods, step-wise tests, alternative AIV s based on corporate
news events, as well as other specifications.
Finally, we provide additional evidence to illuminate the understanding of the pricing
impact of AIV . First, because the post-earnings-announcement drift is a well-documented
return anomaly and the post-earnings-announcement drift might be related to the measure-
ment of AIV , we verify that even though they are somewhat related, the pricing of AIV
is not driven by the post-earnings-announcement drift. Second, it is tempting to relate the
pricing of AIV to the idiosyncratic volatility anomaly documented by Ang et al. (2006, 2009;
hereafter AHXZ). However, our results show that the pricing of AIV is distinct from the
idiosyncratic volatility anomaly. The idiosyncratic volatility in both pre- and non-earnings-
announcement periods contributes to the pricing of AIV . Third, despite the assumption
that information risk is multifaceted, AIV as the price-based information risk measure may
capture the same aspect of information risk proxied by quantity-based measures. We find
that AIV is still significantly priced with different quantity-based information risk measures
as control. Last, we show that the pricing of AIV is robust to the control of additional
risk and mispricing variables such as stock turnover, short interest ratio, analyst coverage,
corporate investment, profitability, accruals, etc.
The contribution of this paper can be understood as follows. First, because theoretical
studies regarding whether information risk is priced yield opposite predictions that are de-
rived from their different assumptions, our results provide a specific case in which the risk
in information related to earnings announcements is priced, supporting the prediction that
information risk is priced in general. Second, the price-based measure we construct is simple
yet powerful to capture contemporary, information-related activities and risk premiums for
future returns. We acknowledge that the measure we construct may not reflect all aspects
of information risk and all information events. We also note that the idea developed in this
paper to construct the measure of information risk based on earnings announcements may
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also be applied to other information events such as merges and acquisitions, product recalls,
and patent applications.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a more in-
depth discussion of how our information risk measure, AIV , is motivated and describes the
construction and summary statistics of the measure. Section 3 shows that the information
risk measure, AIV , is contemporaneously related to various informed trading activities, but
it is only weakly related to alternative information risk measures in the literature. Section 4
presents formal asset pricing tests and shows that the information risk captured by AIV
is priced. Section 5 further examines whether the pricing of AIV derives from information
risk. The last section concludes. The Internet Appendix contains tables, referred to as Table
IA, of further results that are not reported but briefly discussed in the main text.
2. Measuring information risk
2.1. Quantity- and price-based information risk measures
Quantity-based information risk measures have their pros and cons. Although PIN has
been widely used in the literature, critics of this measure have also emerged. DY argue that
PIN is priced not based on its information risk component but on its illiquidity component.
Furthermore, Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009) and Lai, Ng, and Zhang (2014) challenge
the robustness of the return predictability of PIN in extended samples. In addition, it is
also becoming increasingly difficult to estimate PIN because of the ever-growing number of
trades and high-frequency algorithmic trading (Kim and Stoll, 2014; Brogaard, Hendershott,
and Riordan, 2016; Duarte, Hu, and Young, 2017).
Nonpricing evidence regarding other quantity-based information risk measures is also
documented in the literature. For the US market, Chung and Huh (2016) show that the
pricing effect of the adverse selection costs of trading by Glosten and Harris (1988) and
Foster and Viswanathan (1993) is subsumed by the corresponding noninformation costs of
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trading. For the international markets, Lai, Ng, and Zhang (2014) show that the relative
trade informativeness measure of Hasbrouck (1991), the percentage price impact measure of
Huang and Stoll (1996), the adverse selection component of Huang and Stoll (1997), and the
asymmetric information parameter of Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) exhibit
no strongly significant pricing effects.
Although informed trading can be discerned from unusual trading quantities, it can also
be identified from prices because informed trading is more likely to cause prices to change.
In our study, we construct a price-based information risk measure, AIV , to be used in
the empirical part of the paper. The measure is based on idiosyncratic volatility rather
than on the order flow or trading size that characterizes quantity-based information risk
measures. It has been recognized in the literature that idiosyncratic volatility is related to
firm-specific information impounded in stock prices by informed traders. In an influential
paper, Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) find that the market model R2 tends to be higher
for emerging countries than for developed countries. The intuitive explanation provided by
these authors is that more firm-specific information is available to the market in developed
countries, whereas the lack of firm-specific information in emerging countries forces investors
to infer information for one firm from the price changes of other firms, thereby causing
synchronized price changes across firms.
There have been many follow-up studies in the literature (e.g., Durnev, Morck, and
Yeung, 2004; Ferreira and Laux, 2007) that mostly confirm the Morck, Yeung, and Yu
(2000) findings, particularly in cross-country studies (e.g., Jin and Myers, 2006; Fernandes
and Ferreira, 2008, 2009; Dang, Moshirian, and Zhang, 2015). At the firm level, the issue is
much more complicated because idiosyncratic volatility also includes a firm’s business and
financial risks (e.g., Wei and Zhang, 2006) in addition to risks caused by informed trading. In
the empirical part of this paper, we use the difference in idiosyncratic volatilities between a
period with a substantial amount of informed trading and a period with no or little informed
trading to mitigate the impact of business and financial risks on idiosyncratic volatility.
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In the empirical study below, we use the earnings announcement as the event of informa-
tion release. We calculate the difference in idiosyncratic volatilities between pre-earnings-
announcement and non-earnings-announcement periods as a firm’s abnormal idiosyncratic
volatility, AIV . We show that the cross-sectional variation in AIV corresponds to much of
the contemporaneous information-related trading activities and contains explanatory power
for future return differences.
2.2. An empirical measure of information risk
To capture informed trading activity, we use the idiosyncratic volatility of a stock during
a period with a high probability of informed trading, and we compare it with idiosyncratic
volatility during a normal period. A period prior to an earnings announcement is a natural
choice for a period with a high probability of informed trading because private information
gathering is more profitable during such a period.5 There is an abundance of both theo-
retical arguments and empirical evidence showing that informed trading is pervasive prior
to earnings announcements (Krinsky and Lee, 1996; Kim and Verrecchia, 1997; Vega, 2006;
Bamber, Barron, and Stevens, 2011; Brennan, Huh, and Subrahmanyam, 2016; Back, Crotty,
and Li, 2018).
We measure idiosyncratic volatility relative to the Fama and French (1993) three-factor
model (FF-3) using the following regression:
Ri = αi + βiMKT + siSMB + hiHML+ εi, (1)
where Ri is the daily excess return of stock i, MKT is the value-weighted market portfolio
excess return over the risk-free rate, SMB is the size factor, and HML is the value factor.
The regression is run for each stock and each month using past one-year daily returns to
obtain the estimated daily residual, still denoted εi for brevity.
5According to Kim and Verrecchia (1991a, 1991b), informed investors acquire private information prior
to earnings announcement and trade both before and after the earnings are made public. In other words,
an anticipated earnings announcement stimulates more private information gathering because the value of
private information can be realized immediately after the earnings are announced. Thus, we expect more
informed trading to occur in the pre-earnings-announcement period.
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For each stock at the end of each month-end, we define the pre-earnings-announcement
periods (PEAs) as the five business days before the most recent four earnings announcement
days and non-earnings-announcement periods (NEAs) as all the days during the one-year
period ending at the month of the last earnings announcement, excluding the 11 business
days surrounding each of the four earnings announcement days. For example, consider a
firm at the end of December 2014. Suppose the firm made earnings announcement during
business hours on March 12, June 11, September 10, and December 10 in 2014, which are all
Wednesdays. The PEA consists of March 5-11, June 4-10, September 3-9, and December 3-9
of 2014. The NEA is all business days in 2014, excluding March 5-19, June 4-18, September
4-17, and December 4-17. Note that days during the PEA and NEA for the firm at the end
of January and February 2015 are the same as those at the end of December 2014, as the
last announcement day is the same.6
We compute the annualized idiosyncratic volatility of a stock for pre-earnings-announcement
days (IVPEA) and for non-earnings-announcement days (IVNEA) as the log of the annualized
standard deviations of the residual from Eq. (1) during these days, assuming that there are














where nPEA and nNEA are the number of days in the pre- and non-earnings announcement
periods, respectively.
To tease out the idiosyncratic volatility component that is related to information risk
surrounding earnings announcements, we use the difference between pre- and non-earnings-
announcement periods. We coin the difference in log idiosyncratic volatility as the abnormal
6We thank the referee for suggesting not to update the NEA days for the two months after the last an-
nouncement month because this may cause complications with the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle. Following
this suggestion, we also do not update AIV for the current month if the last earnings announcement is made
within the last five business days of the previous month.
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idiosyncratic volatility (AIV ),
AIV = IVPEA − IVNEA. (3)
AIV is calculated for each firm at the end of each month using the daily data over the past
year ending the month of the last earnings announcement. Since almost all stocks make
quarterly announcements, AIV changes every three months for a given stock, although
the changes occur in different months for different stocks. We construct AIV to capture
information risk related to earnings announcements.
2.3. Data sample and summary statistics
We construct the main data set used in our analysis from Center for Research in Securities
Prices (CRSP) and Compustat. We obtain stock and market returns data from CRSP and
firm fundamentals and earnings announcement data from Compustat. Our final sample
includes all common stocks listed on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq that are covered in
CRSP and Compustat. We begin our data with 1972 because Compustat began recording
earnings announcement dates in that year. We exclude stocks with prices below one dollar
at the end of last June. To accurately calculate idiosyncratic volatility in the pre-earnings-
announcement period, we adjust the earnings announcement date to the next trading day if
an earnings announcement is made after 4:00 pm. We obtain earnings announcement times
from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES) and RavenPack database.7 We
winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the influence of
outliers. Our final sample consists of 1,547,696 firm-month observations spanning from July
1972 to December 2015.
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for certain key variables used in the subsequent
analysis.8 AIV is our key price-based measure of information risk, defined as IVPEA−IVNEA
7We adjust the earnings announcement dates for the sample after 2000. We use the date reported in
Compustat as the earnings announcement date if the earnings announcement time is not available. The
results are unaffected by the earnings announcement date adjustment.
8The summary statistics for the rest of the variables used in this study are included in Table IA.1 of the
Internet Appendix.
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in Eq. (3). R is the monthly stock excess return over one-month T-Bill rate. βMkt is the
market beta of the stock with respect to the CRSP value-weighted index estimated following
Fama and French (1992). Size is the log of market capitalization at the end of last June. BM
is the log of the book-to-market ratio. Following AHXZ, IVAHXZ is the annualized standard
deviation of daily residuals based on the FF-3 model during the previous month. Illiquidity
is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity. We also follow Brennan et al. (2012) and include four separate
past stock returns (R−1, R[−3,−2], R[−6,−4], R[−12,−7]) in our asset pricing analysis.
Table 1 here
The grand mean (or median) of AIV shows that the annualized idiosyncratic volatility
during the five-day pre-earnings-announcement period is, on average, 1% higher than that
on a non-earnings-announcement day. A proportion of AIV observations are negative, and
negative AIV could be driven by two reasons. First, a higher level of idiosyncratic volatility
during the non-earnings announcement period may reflect firms’ larger fundamental risk or
investors’ more extensive noise trading (e.g., Wei and Zhang, 2006; Teoh, Yang, and Zhang,
2007; Hou, Peng, and Xiong, 2013).
Second, there are many other corporate events such as mergers and acquisitions (M&As)
or product recalls during the non-earnings announcement days, for which idiosyncratic
volatility can be large due to the same informational reason as earnings announcements.9
The length of the pre-announcement period for which informed trading may occur also dif-
fers. As such, there is no easy way of cleansing all these corporate events for the sample
period we use. We note that the existence of these corporate events and resultant noises
would work against our hypothesis because these events may make our AIV measure a less
accurate proxy for information risk. By comparing the standard deviation of AIV with its
mean (or median), we also observe a wide variation of AIV . Large variation per se helps
9In Section 4.4., we verify this possibility using RavenPack database, which covers a much shorter sample
period from 2001 to 2015. The idiosyncratic volatility surrounding some corporate events, such as M&As or
bankruptcies, tends to be very large.
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capture the distinct feature of information risk across firms and over time. But the part
caused by noises interfere our inferences.
Fig. 1 (a) plots the average absolute residual return from the FF-3 model around earn-
ings announcement days for stocks in the full sample. The bell-shaped pattern reveals a
large surprise in stock returns surrounding the announcements. The substantial variation in
stock returns indicates information leakage prior to earnings announcements, and that the
leaked information is incorporated into stock prices through informed trading (e.g., Vega,
2006; Back, Crotty, and Li, 2018). The large variations in post-earnings announcements
are consistent with the earnings drift (Kothari, 2001) and investor disagreement (Kondor,
2012), which are well-documented phenomena in the literature. The figure also plots the
average stock turnover (number of shares traded deflated by number of shares outstand-
ing). The high trading activity during the pre-earnings-announcement period is consistent
with the theoretical prediction of Kim and Verrecchia (1991a, 1991b) that informed in-
vestors trade before earnings announcements, which is also evidenced by Ali, Klasa, and Li
(2008). Similar to the stock return variation, the higher turnover during and after earnings
announcements is driven by either informed traders realizing their private information or
heterogeneous investors’ differential interpretations on earnings announcements (Kim and
Verrecchia, 1997; Kandel and Pearson, 1995). Overall, despite the noises contained in the
non-earnings-announcement days due to other information events, earnings announcements
do represent the most important information events.
Figure 1 here
3. AIV and information risk
In this section, we examine whether AIV is related to information risk. We preform a
set of tests to evaluate the information risk content of AIV . First, we examine the relation
between AIV and informed return run-ups prior to earnings announcements. Second, we
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examine the association of AIV with abnormal insider trading, short selling, and institutional
trading. Third, we verify whether stocks with negative AIV indeed have a lower level of
information risk. Fourth, we test the persistence of AIV . Finally, we summarize the relations
between AIV and other firm characteristics including alternative measures of information
risk.
3.1. AIV and informed return run-ups prior to earnings announcements
A higher value of AIV may come from a coincidence that noise traders buy shares, and
then the stock price increases prior to unexpectedly negative earnings announcements. In
this circumstance, stocks with high AIV would be misinterpreted as those suffering large
information asymmetry. Thus, it is important for us to verify whether certain traders are
truly informed about upcoming earnings announcements for stocks with high AIV . Specifi-
cally, we examine the relation between AIV and the magnitude of informed return run-ups
prior to earnings announcements.
Presumably, if a return run-up has the same sign as an upcoming earnings announcement
surprise, it is indicative of informed trading. If the run-up is small in magnitude or has
the opposite sign with the earnings surprise, then naturally no informed trading should be
implied. We use the product between earnings surprise and return run-ups to measure the
magnitude of informed return run-ups prior to earnings announcements.
In calculation, we follow Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) to define earnings surprise, SUE,
as the difference between current earnings and last year’s earnings, scaled by the stock price.
We also calculate an alternative measure of earnings surprise, SUEFC , as the difference
between current earnings and the mean of most recent analysts forecast of earnings, scaled
by the stock price. SUEFC is a refined measure taking into account the analyst forecast
information that advances the market expectation prior to earnings announcements. We
denote SUESign as the sign of SUE and SUEFCSign as the sign of SUEFC . Return run-up,
RunUp, is the five-day cumulative abnormal stock return during pre-earnings announcement
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days. This variable measures the abnormal price change immediately before an earnings
announcement. A similar variable is used by Banerjee and Eckard (2001) in the context
of M&A announcements for which prices always go up. We denote RunUpSign as the
sign of RunUp. We use the product between SUESign (or SUEFCSign) and RunUp (or
RunUpSign) to capture the extent of informed trading.
Table 2 reports the results of regressions of AIV on four measures for informed return
run-ups based on cross-products outlined above, with and without other control variables.
For each of the regressions, AIV is found to be positively and significantly related to the
variables of informed return run-ups. Using the portfolio approach, Table IA.2 of the Internet
Appendix shows similar results that AIV is positively associated with informed return run-
ups.10 This set of results provides the first evidence that AIV is related to informed trading
and seems to be a legitimate measure of information risk.
Table 2 here
We also include commonly used asset pricing variables in the regressions in Table 2.
They are market beta (βMkt), market capitalization (Size), book-to-market ratio (BM),
AHXZ’s idiosyncratic volatility (IVAHXZ), Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity (Illiquidity), accru-
als (Accruals), earnings quality (AQ), the number of analysts following (Analyst), an-
alyst dispersion (FDisp), analyst forecast errors (FErr), and missing analyst indicator
(MissingAnalyst). Several notable observations emerge from the table.
First, AIV is positively related to βMkt. It is insignificantly and negatively related to the
book-to-market ratio, slightly higher for growth firms. Interestingly, AIV does not show a
clear relation with market capitalization, Size, which is plausibly driven by the fact that the
calculation of AIV as the difference between IVPEA and IVNEA wash out a majority of firm
10The relation between AIV and informed run-ups appears to be nonmonotonic in Panels A1 and A3. The
reason is that the the absolute value of RunUp is positively correlated with AIV . Therefore, the relation
between RunUp and AIV tends to be strong for either uninformed run-ups (the first quintile portfolio) or
informed run-ups (the fifth quintile portfolio). Such relation makes the positive relation between AIV and
informed run-ups appear less monotonic.
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characteristics. In Table IA.3, we find that large stocks have lower AIV if conditional on
IVNEA. IVNEA is highly correlated with idiosyncratic volatility, and Bali and Cakici (2008)
show that the relation between size and idiosyncratic volatility is negative. Given that AIV
is the difference between the log of idiosyncratic volatility between pre- and non-earnings-
announcement periods, the occasional, positive association between Size and AIV is partly
due to large stocks having a lower value of IVNEA.
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Second, the results suggest that stocks with high AIV tend to have lower idiosyncratic
volatility. This finding is consistent with certain theories. For example, informed traders
avoid stocks with high arbitrage risk, as proxied by idiosyncratic volatility (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997). On the other hand, much of the negative association can be mechanical
because AIV is defined as the difference between IVPEA and IVNEA, and IVNEA is positively
correlated with IVAHXZ . Because the pricing effect of IVAHXZ remains largely a puzzle, we
do not delve further on the subject.
Third, Illiquidity is strongly and positively associated with AIV . The positive relation
between Illiquidity and AIV is well expected because information risk is a main reason for
stock illiquidity. In Table IA.4, we further show that stocks with high abnormal illiquidity
proxied by abnormal Amihud’s illiquidity or abnormal effective spread have higher AIV .
Accruals and Analyst also have significantly positive coefficients, consistent with the infor-
mation risk interpretation. Other variables such as AQ and MissingAnalyst are not strongly
associated with AIV .
11Unconditional on other variables, AIV is positively associated with Size. Another possible explanation
is that large firms have more shares available to be lent to short sellers who contribute to high abnormal
idiosyncratic volatility during earnings announcements (Saffi and Sturgessz, 2011; Massa, Zhang, and Zhang,
2015). Although conventional wisdom suggests that small firms might be characterized by higher information
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, information asymmetry among outside investors may be lower in
these firms. The rationale is that outside speculators may not be incentivized to collect private information
and trade on small firms, which often feature poor corporate governance that discourages informed trading
(e.g., Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000; Durnev, Morck, and Yeung, 2004; Ferreira and Laux, 2007). This is also
partially due to the fact that the AIV used in this paper is derived from earnings related information risk
only.
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3.2. Insider trading, short selling and institutional trading
The most important and difficult task that must be undertaken to justify AIV as a
measure of information risk is to link AIV to trading activities by informed traders. In this
section, we consider three types of informed traders; namely, corporate insiders, short sellers,
and institutional investors.
Corporate insiders: among all types of possible informed traders, corporate insiders have
the most direct access to firm-specific information. Although corporate insiders are prohib-
ited by law from trading using material nonpublic information, and insiders in certain firms
are disallowed to trade stocks of their firms during a period before corporate event announce-
ments including earnings announcements,12 corporate insiders nonetheless earn huge trading
profits with their private information (e.g., Aboody and Lev, 2000; Piotroski and Roulstone,
2005; Ravina and Sapienza, 2010; Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski, 2012). Therefore, any
evidence that stocks characterized by high abnormal insider trading during earnings an-
nouncement periods also have large AIV would support our hypothesis that AIV is related
to information risk.
We obtain insider trading data from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Official Summary of Security Transactions and Holdings in the Thomson Reuters insider
filings database. We examine open market purchases and sales by insiders. We aggregate
purchases and sales by all corporate insiders of the same firm on the same trading day. For
a given stock at the end of each calendar year, we calculate the pre-earnings-announcement
insider trading activity (ITPEA) as the annualized daily average proportion of shares traded
by insiders in the period from five days to one day prior to the past earnings announcements
12Insiders in the US must report specific details for each of their trades. This requirement dates back to
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 under which the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5. This regulation
requires that certain persons who have material nonpublic information about a firm should disclose that
information or abstain from trading. The US Supreme Court clarified that the rule applies to the firm’s
insiders, namely, its officers and directors, as well as controlling shareholders. With the promulgation of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the SEC adopted new rules and shortened the window for most SEC filings
involving insider trading information to two business days after the buy or sell transaction. Prior to this
change, the reporting period typically lasted until the 10th day of the month following the insiders’ trades.
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in that calendar year. Similarly, we compute non-earnings-announcement insider trading
activity (ITNEA) as the annualized daily average proportion of shares traded by insiders on all
days of the past year, excluding the period from five days before to five days after an earnings
announcement. The abnormal insider trading activity (AIT ) is therefore the difference in
insider trading between pre- and non-earnings-announcement periods (ITPEA − ITNEA).
The columns marked as M1 and M2 in Panel A of Table 3 report the results of regressions
of AIV on AIT with and without other control variables. The results show that AIV are
positively and significantly related to AIT . The model with control variables even exhibits a
stronger relation. While the goodness-of-fit is not large, it reveals that some of the variation
in AIV is indeed associated with abnormal insider trading prior to earnings announcements
for some firms, given that many other firms have restrictions on their insiders to trade before
earnings announcements. Among control variables in M2, we add a new control variable,
AV ol, which is abnormal trading volume defined as the difference in the daily average number
of million shares traded between pre- and non-earnings-announcement periods. The positive
relation between AV ol and AIV indicates that abnormal idiosyncratic volatility ahead of
earnings is associated with abnormally high trading volume. The presence of AV ol does not
subsume the significance of AIT in explaining AIV . Panels A1 and B1 of Table IA.5 further
reveal a similar positive association between AIV and AIT using the portfolio approach.
Table 3 here
Fig. 1 (b) plots the average absolute residual return from the FF-3 model around earnings
announcement days for stocks with large and small quintile stock portfolios sorted by AIT
separately. Consistent with M1 and M2 of Table 3, stocks in the highest AIT quintile
have a larger return variation prior to earnings announcements, which leads to a smaller
announcement-day surprise relative to stocks in the lowest AIT quintile.
Short sellers: following the previous literature, short sellers are also selected as prominent
representatives of informed traders. Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) show that short
16
sellers contribute to more than 10% of daily trading volume and are extremely informed.
International evidence also shows that short selling is associated with an increase in the
speed with which information is incorporated into prices (e.g., Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu,
2007; Beber and Pagano, 2013; Saffi and Sturgessz, 2011; Massa, Zhang, and Zhang, 2015).
We obtain the information on short sales from Markit Securities Finance Analytics.
Markit data represents the largest pool of loanable equities in the world, and it includes
firms with lending data of 90% of the market capitalization of CRSP firms in the US market.
We use the daily open short interest from January 2007 to December 2015. More detailed
descriptions of the data can be found in Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011).
For each stock at the end of each calendar year, we calculate the pre-earnings-announcement
short selling activity (SSPEA) as the annualized average daily absolute change in the short
interest ratio during the period from five days before to one day before earnings announce-
ments during the calendar year. Because both the increase and decrease in short interest
convey short sellers’ trading information, our measure uses the absolute value of the change
in the short interest ratio. The short interest ratio is the number of shares that are currently
being shorted divided by the number of shares outstanding. The non-earnings-announcement
short selling activity (SSNEA) is the annualized average daily absolute change in the short
interest ratio in all days in the same calendar year, excluding the period from five days be-
fore to five days after an earnings announcement. Abnormal short selling activity (ASS) is
therefore the difference in short sales between pre- and non-earnings-announcement periods
(SSPEA − SSNEA).
Columns M3 and M4 in Panel A of Table 3 report the regressions of AIV on ASS with
and without controls. We show that AIV is strongly and positively associated with ASS.
This finding adds creditability to AIV as a measure of information risk. In particular, after
controlling for other potentially relevant variables, among which AV ol explains much of the
variation in AIV , ASS remains very significant. We conduct a similar analysis using the
portfolio approach, and the result presented in Panels A2 and B2 of Table IA.5 further
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confirm that AIV is positively associated with ASS.
Fig. 1 (c) plots the average absolute residual return from the FF-3 model around earnings
announcement days for stocks with large and small quintile stock portfolios sorted separately
by ASS. Stocks with a larger ASS appear to have a larger return variation before earnings
announcements, which leads to a smaller announcement-day surprise relative to stocks in
the lowest ASS quintile.
Institutional investors: our next inquiry involves the relation between AIV and institu-
tional trading. Institutional investors are resourceful with respect to collecting information,
skillful in analyzing the collected information, and powerful in mobilizing their funds. Puck-
ett and Yan (2011) find that institutional investors earn significant abnormal returns in
their trading. Hendershott, Livdan, and Schurhoff (2015) find that institutional trading
volume predicts both the occurrence and sentiment of news announcements. More specifi-
cally, Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz (2009) show that institutional trades are highly
informed regarding near-future earnings announcements. Therefore, institutional trading
activity may increase idiosyncratic volatility before earnings announcements.
We obtain daily institutional trading information from the ANcerno data set. ANcerno
provides consulting services to help institutional investors monitor their trading costs. The
data set covers all the equity transaction histories of its institutional clients for each equity
trade over the January 1999 to June 2015 period. The ANcerno data set has been widely
used in studying institutional trading activity. A more detailed description of the data can
be found in Puckett and Yan (2011) and Jame (2018).
For each stock at the end of each calendar year, we calculate the pre-earnings-announcement
institutional trading activity (INPEA), which is the annualized daily average proportion of
shares traded by institutions in the period from five days to one day prior to the past earnings
announcements in that calendar year. The non-earnings-announcement institutional trading
activity (INNEA) is the annualized daily average proportion of shares traded by institutions
on all days in the same calendar year, excluding the period from five days before to five
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days after an earnings announcement. The abnormal institutional trading activity (AIN) is
therefore the difference in institutional trading between pre- and non-earnings-announcement
periods (INPEA − INNEA).
The columns marked as M5 and M6 in Panel A of Table 3 report the regressions of AIV
on AIN with and without other control variables. Again, the results show that AIV is
positively and significantly associated with AIN . The result of the portfolio approach in
Panels A3 and B3 of Table IA.5 further confirms this positive association.
Fig. 1 (d) plots the average abnormal absolute residual return from the FF-3 model
around earnings announcement days for stocks with large and small quintile stock portfolios
sorted separately by AIN . Stocks with a larger AIN appear to have a larger return varia-
tion before earnings announcements, although the announcement-day abnormal returns are
similar across the two portfolios.
In the columns marked as M7 and M8 in Panel A of Table 3, all the three informed trading
variables (AIT , ASS, and AIN) are included to explain AIV . All three variables are also
positive and significant. Taken together, our findings provide the consistent evidence that
AIV is related to information risk induced by informed traders such as corporate insiders,
short sellers, and institutional investors prior to earnings announcements.
Further evidence: AIT , ASS, and AIN captures the magnitude of abnormal trading
activities for insiders, short sellers, and institutional investors. It is plausible that these
informed traders bet on a wrong direction of future earnings announcements. To address this
concern, we first calculate the net insider purchase (AITNet), the decrease in short interest
(ASSNet),
13 and the net purchase by institution investors (AINNet). Second, we construct
the three variables of directional informed trading: (AITNet×RunUp)+, (ASSNet×RunUp)+,
and (AINNet × RunUp)+. Each of the three variables is defined as the positive part of the
13We use the decrease instead of increase in short interest to make the sign of ASSNet consistent with
the direction of informed trading. For example, a decrease in short selling or positive ASSNet indicates
good news is expected, while an increase in short selling or negative ASSNet indicates bad news is expected.
Defined this way, its coefficient should be positive under our hypothesis, like those of other two variables.
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product of AITNet (ASSNet or AINNet) and RunUp. If the value of the product is negative,
the variable is set as zero. The three variables measure whether abnormal insider trading,
short selling, and institutional trading are in the same direction as the stock return run-up
ahead of earnings announcements. The results in Panel B of Table 3 indeed show that AIV
is positively associated with directional informed trading, where abnormal trading activities
are in line with the stock return run-up. This finding is consistent with our interpretation
that when insiders, short sellers, and institutional investors have private information, their
trading activities drive AIV higher.
3.3. Negative AIV
In principle, AIV as the measure of information risk should be nonnegative. The logic
is that if informed traders have little private information, the stock price should experience
an insignificant movement prior to earnings announcements. For stocks with a larger degree
of information asymmetry, informed traders would trade aggressively and hence result in a
substantial price variation prior to earnings announcements. For either case, we expect AIV
to be greater than zero. However, in Table 1, we observe a proportion of firm-years for which
AIV is negative. Thus, it is our onus to explain why we obtain negative AIV and also to
verify whether stocks with negative AIV indeed have a lower level of information risk.
Negative AIV is caused by several reasons. First, firms may undertake more corporate
activities during the non-earnings announcement period than the pre-earnings announcement
period. More corporate activities result in a higher fundamental risk, which can be reflected
in idiosyncratic volatility. Second, there are many other corporate events such as M&As or
product recalls during the non-earnings announcement days, for which idiosyncratic volatility
can be large due to the same informational reason as earnings announcements. Third, given
the non-earnings announcement period is longer than the pre-earnings announcement period
and idiosyncratic volatility is measured based on past realized stock returns, the likelihood
of extreme price movement caused by noise trading tends to be higher during the non-
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earnings announcement period. Taken together, AIV tend to have large cross-sectional and
time-series variation, and the negative value of AIV is plausible.
Next, we verify whether stocks with negative AIV as a group indeed have a lower level of
information risk. Specifically, we use the sign of AIV , denoted as DAIV , as the dependent
variable. We perform probit regressions to reexamine the relation between DAIV and in-
formed trading variables in Table 4. Panel A of Table 4 is the counterpart of Table 2. While
the dependent variable and the regression model are different, the signs of the coefficients
remain mostly unchanged, and the significance appears even stronger. The sign of AIV is
found to be positively and significantly related to the variables of informed return run-ups.
Panel B of Table 4 is the counterpart of Table 3. Consistent with the results of AIV ,
stocks with negative AIV have a lower level of abnormal insider trading, short selling, and
institutional trading. In Table IA.6, we further replicate Tables 2 and 3 using only the
subsamples of firms with negative AIV . Relative to stocks with slight negative AIV , those
stocks with very negative AIV experience a lower level of informed return run-ups, abnormal
insider trading, short selling, and institutional trading.
Overall, the results suggest that stocks with negative AIV have a lower level of informa-
tion risk than those with positive AIV . AIV indeed measures information risk, though it is
not free of noise.
Table 4 here
3.4. Persistence of AIV
AIV is constructed to capture the risk associated with asymmetric information. The
persistence of information risk measures might be different from that of fundamental risk
measures for several reasons. First, private information regarding the valuation of a firm
is short lived in an efficient market and sometimes occurs in a random fashion. The time
distribution of private information depends on many factors such as the industry of a firm,
21
the demand shock to the firm’s products, the research and development effort that the firm
makes, and the likelihood of innovation failure, etc. Many of these factors tend to be time
varying. For example, technology development often takes uneven paces, which create hot
issues at different times across different industries.
Second, information risk is generated when informed investors trade on private informa-
tion in a short-term period. For example, institutional investors such as hedge funds follow
the change in a firm’s fundamentals and move quickly in and out of the firm’s stocks. Given
the prohibition of trading on material nonpublic information, insiders must trade discreetly
to avoid being caught trading illegally. Similarly, short selling activities become intense only
if the stock is regarded as overpriced. As such, information risk measures would be updated
quickly.
All these features lend support to the notion that a measure of information risk should
be conditional and fast changing and thereby may not be as persistent as other firm charac-
teristics, such as price ratios, size, financial leverage, and the number of analysts following.
In short, persistence is not a necessary condition for a measure of information risk.
We confirm in the Internet Appendix that AIV is not persistent. In Table IA.7, we
conduct the Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression approach and regress current AIV on
past AIV . The result shows that the 12-month autoregressive coefficient of AIV is 0.067
only, even though the coefficient is statistically significant. Furthermore, the transition
matrix of Table IA.8 shows that the current position of a firm belonging to a AIV quintile
portfolio does not predict to which portfolio the firm would belong 12 months later. To
further understand the transition matrix results, Table IA.9 shows that the AIV value of
portfolio sorted by industry or firm size is relatively more persistent than firm-level AIV . In
Table IA.10, we show that several other information risk variables documented in the asset
pricing literature, namely probability of symmetric order-flow shocks (PSOS), Accruals,
and FErr, may not be persistent either.
Because AIV is calculated as the difference between IVPEA and IVNEA, we examine
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the persistence of the two variables individually to understand the source of the lack of
persistence in AIV . Table IA.11 shows that IVNEA is as persistent as idiosyncratic volatility
calculated over the one-year period because they differ only for a total of 44 days (four times
11 days surrounding earnings announcements). IVPEA, however, is relatively less persistent
than IVNEA, in a way consistent with the notion we describe above that information risk is
time varying and fast changing. Given that IVPEA is correlated with IVNEA, the cancellation
of the correlated component between IVPEA and IVNEA makes AIV much less persistent.
3.5. Relations with quantity-based information risk measures
In this section, we investigate the relations between AIV and other information risk
measures, especially the quantity-based information risk measures. The purpose is to gauge
the degree that AIV can serve as a new information risk measure. If AIV proposed in this
study is highly correlated with existing measures of information risk, or if it can be well
explained by the combination of other existing information risk measures, then AIV may
simply be a proxy for a similar type of information risk, and the incremental contribution of
AIV as a new information risk proxy would be marginal.
We consider several measures of information risk, mostly quantity-based measures. They
are the probability of informed trading, PINEHO, proposed by Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara
(2002), PINDY , a measure proposed by Duarte and Young (2009) with the same name;
and the probability of symmetric order-flow shocks, PSOS, another measure proposed by
Duarte and Young (2009). We also consider AV ol, used in the previous regressions, abnormal
turnover (ATurn), and abnormal spread (ASpread). The last three variables are defined in
a similar way as AIV , contrasting their pre-earnings announcement value with their post-
earnings announcement value.14
Table 5 here
14AV ol, ATurn, and ASpread are also related to stock market liquidity. Because stock market liquidity
is intimately linked with information asymmetry, we consider them here along with other control variables.
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We regress AIV on each of the six alternative information risk measures, controlling
for other firm characteristics and asset pricing variables. The results are reported in Table
5. First, we find that AIV is not strongly associated with PINEHO and PINDY . Second,
other four information risk measures are significant to various degrees in explaining AIV
with correct signs. However, the explanatory power of these quantity-based information risk
measures for AIV is not substantially large. Although AIV is somewhat related to existing
information risk measures, most of the variation in AIV is not explained by these variables.
The overall results suggest that AIV is a concrete measure of information risk at the
stock level. More importantly, AIV is a new measure of information risk that is not closely
correlated with commonly used pricing factors or alternate measures of information risk.
Our next task is to examine the cross-sectional pricing of AIV .
4. Is the earnings-announcement-related information
risk priced?
In this section, we employ several steps to test the pricing of AIV . First, we look
at the distribution of stock returns across portfolios of stocks single-sorted by AIV and
double-sorted by market capitalization and then by AIV . Second, we test whether AIV
affects cross-sectional expected stock returns using Fama and French’s (1992) asset pricing
framework. Finally, we conduct a variety of robustness tests on the pricing of AIV including
alternative AIV s based on corporate news events.
4.1. Portfolio approach
As the first step in evaluating our hypothesis that the price-based information risk proxied
by AIV is related to future stock returns, we construct monthly equally weighted portfolios
sorted by AIV . Panel A of Table 6 reports average monthly returns in excess of the one-
month T-Bill rate (R) and Fama-French-Carhart four-factor risk-adjusted portfolio alphas
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(RAdj) of single-sorted quintile portfolios formed monthly sorted by AIV . Panel B shows
the RAdj of double-sorted quintile portfolios sorted monthly first by Size measured at prior
June and then by prior-month AIV . All t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on
Newey-West standard errors. The sample period runs from July 1972 to December 2015.
Table 6 here
The results of Panel A show a generally increasing, but slightly tent-shaped, relation
between AIV and future stock returns. From quintile 1 to 3 the relation is monotonically
increasing, but reverses slightly and remains flat for quintiles 4 and 5, for raw returns.
For risk-adjusted returns, the pattern is also increasing in general but nonmonotonically.
The differences in excess and risk-adjusted returns between the high and low AIV quintile
portfolios are both positive and significant at the 1% level. Most importantly, the return
spreads between the high and low AIV quintile portfolios are significant economically. A
trading strategy combining a long position in a high AIV quintile portfolio with a short
position in a low AIV quintile portfolio generates a 1.66% annualized excess return and a
1.90% annualized (Fama-French-Carhart) risk-adjusted return.
There might be a concern that the positive risk premium for AIV is simply a manifes-
tation of return effects related to firm size. To address this potential concern, we employ
double-sorted portfolio returns in Panel B to provide robust evidence that the positive re-
lation between AIV and future stock returns is not driven by market capitalization. The
difference in risk-adjusted returns between high and low AIV quintile portfolios is statis-
tically significant in three of the five Size quintiles. Furthermore, the return differential is
more pronounced in the lowest Size quintile portfolio. The long high-AIV and short low-
AIV trading strategy applied in the lowest Size quintile portfolio yields 4.08% annualized
excess returns. In an unreported analysis, we further conduct a double-sorted portfolio anal-
ysis with the book-to-market ratio or Amihud’s illiquidity and AIV . The positive relation
between AIV and future stock returns is robust for controlling these firm characteristics.
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We have also tried the Fama-French five-factor model and the five-factor plus momentum
factor model. We present the result based on the five-factor model in Table IA.12. The risk-
adjusted portfolio return result based on the five-factor model is slightly weaker than that
of Fama-French-Carhart four-factor models. The result of the five-factor plus momentum
factor model is very much similar to that of the five-factor model.
The results of Panel C show that the predictive power of AIV on future returns declines
over time. The differences in excess returns between the high and low AIV quintile portfolios
become statistically less significant for future months longer than two months. Despite being
statistically insignificant, it is somewhat comfortable that the differences in excess returns
remain positive in each of the 24 months after the portfolios are formed. The inability of AIV
for long-term return prediction is consistent with the low persistence of AIV documented
in Table IA.7 and Table IA.8. That is, when AIV changes over time, its return predictive
power naturally declines over long-term horizons. Similarly, in Table IA.13, we show that
the differences in future AIV between the high and low AIV quintile portfolios also decline
over time, although the differences remain positive and statistically significant.
Overall, the portfolio results provide the first evidence that the price-based information
risk proxied by AIV positively affects future stock returns. In the next step, we conduct
cross-sectional regression analyses to examine the pricing ability of AIV using the Fama-
MacBeth methodology.
4.2. Fama-MacBeth approach
In this section, we follow Fama and French’s (1992) method with cross-sectional return
determinants, including market beta, market capitalization, and the book-to-market ratio
as control. In addition, following Brennan et al. (2012) and AHXZ, we include idiosyncratic
volatility, illiquidity, and past stock returns in our analysis of asset pricing returns. For
each month, we run cross-sectional regressions of monthly stock excess returns on return
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determinants as follows.
Ri,t+1 = a+ b1AIVit + b2βMkt,it + b3Sizeit + b4BMit + b5IVAHXZ,it + b6Illiquidityit
+b7R−1 + b8R[−3,−2],it + b9R[−6,−4],it + b10R[−12,−7],it + εi,t+1,
where Ri,t+1 is the monthly excess stock return for firm i at time t + 1, AIV is abnormal
idiosyncratic volatility, βMkt is market beta, Size is market capitalization, BM is the book-
to-market ratio, IVAHXZ is AHXZ’s idiosyncratic volatility, Illiquidity is Amihud’s (2002)
illiquidity, R−1 is the past month stock return, R[−3,−2] is the past two-month stock returns,
R[−6,−4] is the past three-month stock returns, and R[−12,−7] is the past six-month stock
returns. Time-series averages of the estimates are reported in Table 7. All t-statistics
reported in parentheses are based on Newey-West standard errors. M1–M2 examine the full
sample period from July 1972 to December 2015, M3–M4 examine the period from July 1972
to December 1993, and M5–M6 examine the period from January 1994 to December 2015.
Table 7 here
Panel A of Table 7 reveals several notable findings. First, our hypothesis is that unin-
formed investors demand a risk premium for trading stocks with informed investors prior
to earnings announcements, and hence stocks with high information risk measured by AIV
should compensate for uninformed investors’ potential trading losses. We thus expect a pos-
itive and significant coefficient of AIV . The results support our hypothesis. The coefficients
of AIV are all positive with t-statistics varying from 2.22 to 4.61. Compared with the result
of the portfolio approach, the pricing of AIV in our Fama-MacBeth approach appears to be
more economically significant.
Second, AIV is significantly priced not only in the full sample but also across two subpe-
riods. Notably, the pricing of AIV is more pronounced during the second subperiod, which
is consistent with the astonishing growth in short selling and institutional trading in recent
years.
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Third, we find consistent signs and significance levels for the coefficients of other con-
ventional pricing factors, except for beta, Size, and R[−3,−2]. For example, BM , Illiquidity,
R[−6,−4], and R[−12,−7] have positive and significant coefficients in all the models. IVAHXZ
and R−1 are negatively and significantly associated with monthly excess stock returns.
In Panel B of Table 7, we analyze the relation between AIV and long-term expected
stock returns using the panel regression and cluster standard errors at both the firm and
month levels. The result shows that AIV has a long-horizon predictive power for future
cumulative stock returns. However, in the further tests of long-term monthly returns in
Tables IA.14, we find that the predictive power of AIV comes mainly from short horizons;
the slope coefficients of AIV become statistically less significant for future months longer
than three months. Nevertheless, the coefficients of AIV on future returns remain positive
even up to 24 months after AIV is computed.
4.3. Robustness issues
In this section, we present robustness checks on the use of AIV as an information risk
measure. The issues are whether the AIV effect is driven by small stocks or inactive stocks,
whether the AIV measure is sensitive to the window for its construction, and whether AIV
effect is subject to some microstructure related concerns. The results are reported in Tables
IA.15–18.
Results for large stocks: because the risk premium of AIV is more significant in the
small Size quintile portfolio shown in Table 5, it is natural to inquire whether the relation
between AIV and the cross-section of stock returns is driven by inactive or penny stocks. To
address this concern in the sample selection, we examine a subsample of large and actively
traded stocks by replicating the Fama-MacBeth regressions of M1 and M2 from Table 7 and
report the results in Table IA.15. We include only stocks with a price greater than $5 at
the end of prior June in M1–M2. In M3–M4, we test stocks listed on the NYSE and Amex
only because larger firms are listed and traded on the NYSE/Amex and have high trading
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volumes. We examine stocks with at least 100 shares traded on each trading day over the
past one year in M5–M6. All the results confirm our findings regarding the positive risk
premium of information risk proxied by AIV .
Pre-earnings-announcement window: we define the pre-earnings-announcement window
as a five-day period before the earnings announcement in the main tests. We verify that the
results are robust to alternative definitions of pre-earnings-announcement windows. In Table
IA.16, we examine alternative measurement windows for the pre-earnings-announcement
period of AIV . Here, [-10,-1] ([-3,-1], [-10,-1] [2,10], [-5,-1] [2,5], and [-3,-1] [2,3]) refer to
the alternative measures of AIV (IVPEA − IVNEA), where IVPEA is calculated as the log
annualized standard deviation of daily residuals based on the FF-3 model in days [-10,-1]
([-3,-1], [-10,-1] [2,10], [-5,-1] [2,5], and [-3,-1] [2,3]) prior to quarterly and annual earnings
announcements over the preceding year, and IVNEA is defined as the log annualized standard
deviation of daily residuals based on the FF-3 model excluding days around announcements
[-10,10] ([-3,3], [-10,10], [-5,5], and [-3, 3]) over the preceding year. The results show that
our findings are robust to alternative measurement windows.
Step-wise function: we investigate whether the relation between AIV and expected return
is step-wise. We introduce a step-wise dummy variable, DAIV , which takes the value of one if
AIV is positive, and zero otherwise. In M1–M2 of Table IA.17, the coefficients of the dummy
variable(DAIV ) are positive and significant. However, the significance of DAIV disappears
if AIV is included in M3–M4. This finding suggests that the significant and positive relation
between AIV and expected return is not step-wise but continuous. We further separate the
sample to two parts, AIV < 0 and AIV > 0. We conduct the Fama-Macbeth regressions
separately for the two samples. The result in M5–M8 of Table IA.17 shows that the slope of
AIV is significantly positive for the AIV < 0 subsample and marginally significant for the
AIV > 0 subsample. This result indicates a nonlinear relation between AIV and expected
returns, although the nonlinearity is not a step function. Overall, the results suggest that
the positive relation between AIV and expected returns is not only driven by the sign of
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AIV but also the magnitude of AIV .
Other robustness: finally, to avoid the bid-ask bounce and lagged reaction effects found
in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), we skip one month to test the relation between AIV and
future stock returns. M1 of Table IA.18 skip one month between AIV and Ri,t+1, and we
find that AIV remains significantly priced. Theoretically, idiosyncratic risk can also be
measured by the market model. Therefore, we show the results for an alternative measure
of AIV that is calculated based on the market model instead of the FF-3 model in M2.
In M3, we construct an alternative measure of AIV that is calculated based on earnings-
announcement dates without adjusting for the time of earnings announcements. Raw AIV
is calculated without taking the logarithm transformation of idiosyncratic volatility in M4.
In M5, we estimate a new version of AIV that is adjusted for the nonzero return during
the estimation period.15 In M6, we use a restricted sample with nonmissing information on
insider trading, short selling, or institutional trading. We remove a stock-month observation
if the stock is not covered in all three databases in the prior two years. The restricted sample
has shorter coverage from 1996 to 2015 and has much less sample included. The restricted
sample is larger in Size, has lower AIV and book-to-market ratio, and has higher analyst
coverage. The sample is more liquid measured by past turnover or Amihud’s price impact.
4.4. Further evidence from corporate news events
To estimate AIV , we calculate the difference in idiosyncratic volatility between pre-
earnings-announcement periods and non-earnings-announcement periods. Earnings announce-
ments are selected in this study as the information-intensive event. However, other corporate
events that carry valuable information are presumably useful in this regard as well. To verify















whether AIV is sensitive to the incorporation of other corporate events, we obtain corporate
news data from RavenPack News Analytics.
RavenPack is a leading global news database used by practitioners in quantitative and
algorithmic trading and also by scholars in accounting and finance research (e.g., Kelley
and Tetlock, 2013; Kolasinski, Reed, and Ringgenberg, 2013; Shroff, Verdi, and Yu, 2014;
Dai, Parwada, and Zhang, 2015; Dang, Moshrian, and Zhang, 2015). RavenPack collects
and analyzes real-time, firm-level business news from leading news providers (e.g., Dow
Jones Newswire, The Wall Street Journal, and Barrons) and other major publishers and web
aggregators, including industry and business publications, regional and local newspapers,
government and regulatory updates, and trustworthy financial websites.
News events are categorized by “earnings,” “dividends,” “M&As,” “bankruptcy,” “prod-
uct services,” and many others, with a total of more than 100 news categories. The sample
period of RavenPack is from January 2001 to December 2015. RavenPack constructs the
news sentiment score for each news article based on professional algorithms, which were
developed and evaluated by effectively combining traditional language analysis, financial ex-
pert consensus, and market response methodologies. Specifically, the news sentiment score
indicates whether or not, and to what extent, a news story may have a positive, neutral,
or negative effect on stock prices. This score is assigned to all relevant firms listed in the
news report. The sentiment score ranges from 0 to 100, with a value below (above) 50 indi-
cating the negative (positive) sentiment of a given news. A score of 50 represents a neutral
sentiment.
We construct AIVNews in the same way as AIV by treating news events as earnings
announcements. The results for AIVNews are reported in Table 8. For the sake of comparison,
M1 presents the baseline result using AIV with the same sample period as AIVNews. In M2
(M3), we focus on significant news events and calculate AIVNews by including news articles
with ESS < 40 or ESS > 60 (ESS < 45 or ESS > 55). In M4, all news events are used in
estimating AIVNews. We note that the distributions of various AIVNewss have higher means
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than AIV , with a higher percentage of positive observations.
Table 8 here
The results show that AIVNews also significantly and positively predicts future stock
returns. The magnitudes of the slope coefficients in the three regressions appear similar.
The statistical significance, however, increases with the value of |ESS − 50| (i.e., the value
relevance of the news). The results confirm that our idea of using abnormal idiosyncratic
volatility to construct a price-based information risk measure applies to a broad spectrum
of corporate events as well.
5. Alternative explanations
Our AIV measure is motivated as a price-based measure of information risk, and it is
found to be positively related to future stock returns. However, there might be alternative
explanations of the result. In this section, we examine several alternative explanations and
perform tests to ensure that the pricing of AIV is further robust to various specifications.
5.1. The post-earnings-announcement drift
A well-known phenomenon of the post-earnings-announcement drift has been documented
in the literature. Because our AIV measure is based on price variations surrounding earnings
announcements, a natural question is whether the AIV effect on future stock returns is driven
by the post-earnings-announcement drift. In Section 3, we show that AIV is positively
associated with the product of earnings surprise, SUE, and pre-announcement stock price
run-ups, RunUp. Because the post-earnings announcement drift is a continuation of SUE
and RunUp, we use the two variables as proxies for the expected post-earnings announcement
drift. In particular, we examine whether the effect of AIV on expected returns is subsumed
by either SUE or RunUp.
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The results of Table 9 show that both the coefficients of RunUp and SUE are significantly
positive in predicting future returns. Yet, the coefficient of AIV , though slightly weakened,
remains significantly positive. This finding suggests that the positive relation between AIV
and future stock returns is not driven by the post-earnings-announcement drift.
Table 9 here
In addition to controlling RunUp and SUE, we also scale AIV by the absolute value
of the cumulative abnormal return as AIVAdj = AIV/|CAR(d1, d2)|, where CAR(d1, d2)
is the cumulative abnormal return over the (d1, d2) (e.g., (0,1), (-1,1), (0,5), and (-5, 5))
period including the earnings announcement day. The absolute value of the cumulative
abnormal return measures the magnitude of the post-earnings announcement drift up to
day d2. The rationale behind this construction is that, if AIV is positively correlated with
the post-earnings announcement drift, AIVAdj should be less of concern because the effect
of the post-earnings announcement drift is cancelled out between the numerator and the
denominator.
Columns M4 to M7 in Table 9 indeed show that AIVAdj is positively correlated with future
stock returns. While relative to the baseline regression the coefficient becomes smaller due
to the scaling of AIVAdj, the significance remains strong. Therefore, the result tends not to
support the possibility that the pricing of AIV is driven by the post-earnings announcement
drift.
5.2. The idiosyncratic volatility anomaly
The positive relation between AIV and future stock returns is robust after controlling for
many firm characteristics, including the previous month’s idiosyncratic volatility, IVAHXZ ,
used by AHXZ, as shown in Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9. Because AIV is the difference in the log
of idiosyncratic volatility (of the past year) between pre- and non-earnings-announcement
periods, the concern that the AIV effect on future returns might reflect the IVAHXZ anomaly
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remains valid. After all, the idiosyncratic volatility in the non-earnings-announcement period
of the past year is cross-sectionally and positively correlated with idiosyncratic volatility in
the past month, and AIV is significantly and negatively associated with IVAHXZ , as shown
in Tables 2–4, although the goodness-of-fit is poor together with other explanatory variables.
To quell such concerns, we provide additional evidence in Table 10, which shows that the
AIV effect can be distinguished from the IVAHXZ anomaly.
Panel A of Table 10 reports the average Fama-French-Carhart risk-adjusted future re-
turns, RAdj, on five-by-five portfolios sorted first by IVAHXZ and then by AIV . The results
show that in each of the IVAHXZ quintiles, average future returns increase with AIV , al-
though not monotonically. The difference in average RAdj between the high and low AIV
portfolios is significantly positive for three out of five IVAHXZ quintiles.
Table 10 here
Panel B of Table 10 reports the average Fama-French-Carhart risk-adjusted future re-
turns, RAdj, on five-by-five portfolios sorted first by IVNEA and then by IVPEA. The average
future returns increase with IVPEA in all but the highest IVNEA quintiles and again not
monotonically. The difference in average RAdj between the high and low AIV portfolios is
positive for the second and third IVNEA quintiles. The results provide preliminary evidence
that the pricing of AIV is not driven by the IVAHXZ anomaly, and, to a certain extent, that
IVPEA contributes to the pricing of AIV .
Panel C of Table 10 reports Fama-MacBeth regressions of future returns on IVPEA and
IVNEA separately with other control variables, including IVAHXZ . The results in M1 and
M2 show that neither IVPEA nor IVNEA has a significant effect on future returns when used
alone. When IVPEA and IVNEA are both used in the regression M3, the signs are consistent
with that of AIV . In other words, the future stock return is expected to be high if IVPEA
is high when IVNEA is controlled. This is exactly the reason for how we define AIV . These
results show that the difference between IVPEA and IVNEA matters most in predicting future
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stock returns.
To further mitigate the impact of IVAHXZ on our AIV , we construct AIVOrth as the
residual of AIV regressed on IVAHXZ and IVAHXZ ’s top quintile dummy, which is obtained
when we sort stocks by IVAHXZ . The regression in M4 using AIVOrth clearly shows that,
net of the IVAHXZ effect, AIV has its own effect on future returns.
Overall, the results from Table 10 indicate that the AIV effect on future stock returns
is distinct from the IVAHXZ anomaly.
5.3. Quantity-based information risk measures
Despite the assumption that information risk is multifaceted, AIV , the price-based in-
formation risk measure, may capture the same aspect of information risk as quantity-based
measures. To address this concern, we need to show that AIV is still positively related
to future stock returns after controlling for conventional quantity-based information risk
measures. For example, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) show that PINEHO reflects
information risk implied from order flows and systematically priced by investors, but we do
not include PINEHO in our main analysis. To exclude this alternative interpretation, Table
11 includes PINEHO and the related variables, such as PINDY and PSOS, as additional
control variables.
Table 11 here
The results show that AIV is significantly priced across all the models from M1 to M4
after controlling for alternative measures of information risk.16 Moreover, the t-statistics
of AIV are all significant in these models. Consistent with Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara
(2002) and Duarte and Young (2009), PINEHO and PINDY are positively related to monthly
excess stock returns in untabulated results with only βMkt, Size, and BM as controls. The
16PINEHO is available from 1984–1998, and PINDY and PSOS are available from 1984–2005. Also,
PINEHO, PINDY , and PSOS are only available for NYSE stocks.
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coefficients of PINEHO and PINDY become insignificant in the full specification with the
inclusion of IVAHXZ , Illiquidity, R−1, R[−3,−2], R[−6,−4], and R[−12,−7].
Furthermore, we construct quantity-based information risk measures using abnormal
stock trading volume and turnover prior to earnings announcements and compare them
with AIV . Specifically, abnormal trading volume (AV ol) and abnormal turnover (ATurn)
are defined in a similar way in which we construct AIV .17 M5–M6 reports Fama-MacBeth
regressions of future returns on AV ol and ATurn. The results show that AV ol has no
prediction power on future stock returns, and ATurn is marginally associated with future
returns. Importantly, AIV survives in the pricing competition with these quantity-based
information risk measures.
Finally, we calculate abnormal effective spread (ASprd) as the difference in daily average
proportional effective spread between pre- and non-earnings-announcement periods. M7
reports the Fama-MacBeth regression of future returns on ASprd. The coefficient of ASprd
is not significant, while the pricing of AIV remains robust.
5.4. Additional risk and mispricing measures
As a final checkup, we examine whether the pricing of AIV is robust to the control of
additional variables, which are used in the literature to measure either risk, related to stock
liquidity, default risk, and information environment or mispricing. Specifically, the variables
we choose include the past one-year stock turnover (Turnover), short interest ratio (Short),
missing short interest indicator (MissingShort), the number of analysts following (Analyst),
analyst forecast dispersion (FDisp), analyst forecast errors (FErr), missing analyst indi-
cator (MissingAnalyst), corporate investment (CapEx), gross profitability (GPA), Ohlson’s
(1980) distress score (Oscore), accruals (Accruals), and earnings quality (AQ).
Table 12 here
17AV ol and ATurn are derived from CRSP and are available from 1972–2015.
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Table 12 reports the results by including the above control variables sequentially. First,
we show that AIV remains positively and significantly associated with future stock returns.
This finding suggests that AIV as a return predictor is not a direct proxy for any of these
control variables. Second, most of these additional control variables have coefficients that
maintain the same sign as in the original works. For example, Brennan et al. (2012) and
Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman (2001) find that Turnover is negatively associated
with expected returns. Akbas et al. (2017) and Desai et al. (2002) show that prior-month
short interest ratio is negatively associated with expected returns. Fama and French (2006)
find that after controlling book-to-market ratio (BM), higher rates of investment (CapEx)
imply lower expected returns, and more profitable (GPA) firms have higher expected re-
turns. Dichev (1998) finds that firms with high bankruptcy risk proxied by Oscore earn
lower returns. Sloan (1996) shows that the current level of Accruals is negatively related
to expected returns. Core, Guay, and Verdi (2008) find that the AQ is negatively, but in-
significantly, related to expected return.18 In the unreported result, we include prior-month
average bid-ask spread or abnormal bid-ask spread as a control variable in the asset pricing
test. The return predictability of AIV is not affected by the inclusion of bid-ask spread.
These findings suggest that AIV contains its own unique feature when horse racing with
other information risk measures.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we examine whether the risk due to information asymmetry is compensated
for in expected stock returns. We note that the theoretical models in the literature result
in opposite predictions based on their different assumptions and that the previous empirical
studies encounter issues related to robustness and computational difficulties. We also take a
18Francis et al. (2005) propose that the AQ factor constructed from the AQ mimicking portfolio is a priced
factor, but Core, Guay, and Verdi (2008) find no evidence that AQ is a priced risk factor.
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stand that information risk is multifaceted and cannot be represented with a single measure.
We develop a price-based information risk measure based on a firm’s idiosyncratic volatil-
ity differential between pre- and non-earnings-announcement periods. The price-based in-
formation risk measure we construct, AIV , has variations both across firms and over time.
AIV is related to not only informed return run-ups but also insider trading, short selling,
and institutional trading activities. The higher AIV firm-years are associated with higher
informed return run-ups and abnormal insider trading, short selling, and institutional trad-
ing activities prior to earnings announcements. Moreover, AIV is unrelated to alternative
information risk measures used in the literature.
The information risk captured by AIV is positively associated with expected stock re-
turns. Furthermore, the AIV effect is distinct from quantity-based information risk measures
and not a reflection of the idiosyncratic volatility anomaly, the post-earnings-announcement
drift, and alternative risk and mispricing factors.
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This table presents the summary statistics of main variables used in the asset pricing test of this study.
The main variables are abnormal idiosyncratic volatility (AIV ), pre-earnings-announcement (log)
idiosyncratic volatility (IVPEA), non-earnings-announcement (log) idiosyncratic volatility (IVNEA),
monthly excess returns (R), market beta (βMkt), log market capitalization (Size), log book-to-market
ratio (BM), AHXZ’s idiosyncratic volatility (IVAHXZ), Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity (Illiquidity),
past one-month stock return (R−1), past two-month stock returns (R[−3,−2]), past three-month
stock returns (R[−6,−4]), and past six-month stock returns (R[−12,−7]). All the variables are defined
in Appendix. The summary statistics includes the number of observations, mean, median, standard
deviation (STD), the percentiles (5% and 95%), and quartiles (25% and 75%) distribution of the
variables. The sample period is from July 1972 to December 2015.
Variable Observations Mean STD 5% 25% Median 75% 95%
AIV 1,547,696 0.011 0.322 -0.502 -0.185 0.010 0.206 0.529
IVPEA 1,547,696 -0.944 0.568 -1.871 -1.347 -0.949 -0.555 0.015
IVNEA 1,547,696 -0.955 0.513 -1.785 -1.331 -0.962 -0.598 -0.082
R 1,547,696 0.707 12.169 -17.815 -6.213 -0.080 6.507 22.035
βMkt 1,547,696 1.315 0.329 0.722 1.090 1.300 1.555 1.880
Size 1,547,696 5.076 1.908 2.161 3.645 4.938 6.390 8.455
BM 1,547,696 -0.393 0.792 -1.840 -0.860 -0.315 0.136 0.796
IVAHXZ 1,547,617 0.411 0.273 0.127 0.221 0.336 0.515 0.964
Illiquidity 1,515,731 5.298 15.910 0.004 0.040 0.319 2.390 28.792
R−1 1,540,600 0.011 0.121 -0.173 -0.058 0.003 0.069 0.224
R[−3,−2] 1,533,463 0.022 0.171 -0.233 -0.079 0.009 0.105 0.325
R[−6,−4] 1,526,331 0.035 0.210 -0.273 -0.092 0.016 0.135 0.412
R[−12,−7] 1,508,090 0.077 0.317 -0.356 -0.117 0.037 0.213 0.654
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Table 2
Informed return run-ups prior to earnings announcements and AIV
This table presents panel regression of the abnormal idiosyncratic volatility (AIV ) on informed
return run-ups prior to earnings announcements with control variables and year fixed effects in the
following model.
AIVit = a+ b1InformedRunUp,it + b2βMkt,it + b3Sizeit + b4BMit + b5IVAHXZ,it
+b6Illiquidityit + b7Accrualsit + b8AQit + b9Analystit + b10FDispit + b11FErrit
+b12MissingAnalyst,it + εit+1,
where AIV is abnormal idiosyncratic volatility. InformedRunUp is one of the four variables from
SUESign×RunUp, SUESign×RunUpSign, SUEFCSign×RunUp, or SUEFCSign×RunUpSign.
The control variables are market beta (βMkt), market capitalization (Size), book-to-market ratio
(BM), AHXZ’s idiosyncratic volatility (IVAHXZ), Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity (Illiquidity), accru-
als (Accruals), earnings quality (AQ), number of analysts following (Analyst), analyst dispersion
(FDisp), analyst forecast errors (FErr), and missing analyst indicator (MissingAnalyst). The AIV
is multiplied by 100 to scale up the coefficients. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based
on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at both the firm and year
level. R̄2 is adjusted R2. Intercept and year fixed effects are not tabulated. The sample periods are
1972–2015 for models with SUESign and 1983–2015 for models with SUESignFC .





SUESignFC ×RunUp 46.938 49.575
(7.33) (7.44)
SUESignFC ×RunUpSign 1.845 1.914
(8.12) (8.01)
βMkt 1.163 1.251 1.341 1.452
(2.84) (2.97) (2.52) (2.71)
Size -0.010 -0.063 0.366 0.380
(-0.07) (-0.40) (1.71) (1.76)
BM -0.065 -0.064 -0.354 -0.365
(-0.37) (-0.37) (-1.24) (-1.30)
IVAHXZ -6.068 -5.830 -7.806 -7.479
(-5.46) (-5.47) (-4.35) (-4.20)
Illiquidity 0.023 0.021 0.078 0.075
(2.42) (2.24) (3.23) (3.24)
Accruals 13.345 14.675 8.983 9.554
(4.11) (4.21) (1.52) (1.63)
AQ -0.688 -0.082 -1.633 -1.395
(-0.27) (-0.03) (-0.47) (-0.40)
Analyst 1.203 1.202 0.579 0.554
(4.75) (4.68) (2.33) (2.24)
FDisp -0.192 -0.195 -0.025 0.004
(-1.06) (-1.07) (-0.12) (0.02)
FErr 0.110 0.105 0.140 0.132
(1.08) (1.04) (1.05) (1.00)
MissingAnalyst -0.196 -0.146 0.717 0.725
(-0.48) (-0.35) (1.18) (1.18)
R̄2 2.5% 3.1% 2.1% 2.5% 2.7% 3.2% 2.4% 2.9%
Firms 2,893 2,626 2,893 2,626 2,193 2,002 2,193 2,002
Observations 127,272 115,542 127,272 115,542 72,382 66,078 72,382 66,078
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Table 3
Informed trading and AIV
This table presents panel regression of the abnormal idiosyncratic volatility (AIV ) on measures of
informed trading with control variables and year fixed effects in the following model.
AIVit = a+ b1InformedTrading,it + b2Avolit + b3βMkt,it + b4Sizeit + b5BMit + b6IVAHXZ,it
+b7Illiquidityit + b8Accrualsit + b9AQit + b10Analystit + b11FDispit + b12FErrit
+b13MissingAnalyst,it + εit+1,
where AIV is abnormal idiosyncratic volatility. In Panel A, InformedTrading is abnormal insider
trading (AIT ), abnormal short selling (ASS), or abnormal institutional trading (AIN). In Panel
B, InformedTrading is one of the three positive part of directional informed return run-ups from
AITNet×RunUp, ASSNet×RunUp, or AINNet×RunUp. The (untabulated) control variables are
abnormal trading volume (AV ol), market beta (βMkt), market capitalization (Size), book-to-market
ratio (BM), AHXZ’s idiosyncratic volatility (IVAHXZ), Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity (Illiquidity), ac-
cruals (Accruals), earnings quality (AQ), number of analysts following (Analyst), analyst dispersion
(FDisp), analyst forecast errors (FErr), and missing analyst indicator (MissingAnalyst). The AIV
is multiplied by 100 to scale up the coefficients. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based
on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at both the firm and year
level. R̄2 is adjusted R2. Intercept and year fixed effects are not tabulated. The sample periods
are 1996–2015 for models with AIT or AITNet, 2007–2015 for models with ASS or ASSNet, and
1999–2015 for models with AIN or AINNet.
Panel A: Informed trading and AIV
Variable M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8
AIT 0.861 1.150 3.858 3.457
(1.91) (2.90) (1.97) (3.11)
ASS 6.385 3.324 6.006 1.336
(8.44) (4.86) (2.99) (0.68)
AIN 39.200 25.275 66.905 49.118
(6.88) (5.30) (4.34) (3.78)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
R̄2 1.7% 7.5% 1.8% 9.1% 3.7% 11.2% 4.7% 14.5%
Firms 432 394 2,886 2,421 1,752 1,591 305 280
Observations 8,633 7,889 25,972 21,791 29,776 27,039 2,743 2,522
Panel B: Directional informed return run-ups and AIV
Variable M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8
(AITNet ×RunUp)+ 0.854 1.108 0.465 2.108
(1.66) (2.39) (0.29) (1.44)
(ASSNet ×RunUp)+ 5.124 5.458 2.611 4.777
(4.82) (6.29) (2.90) (3.90)
(AINNet ×RunUp)+ 11.761 12.513 21.970 24.522
(6.30) (6.11) (7.25) (5.32)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
R̄2 1.7% 7.5% 1.9% 9.4% 2.8% 11.4% 3.2% 15.2%
Firms 430 393 2,881 2,418 1,741 1,582 304 279
Observations 8,592 7,851 25,926 21,766 29,597 26,894 2,733 2,512
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Table 4
Informed trading and the sign of AIV
This table repeats the analyses in Table 2 and Panel A of Table 3 using probit regression in the
following model to examine the relation between informed RunUp or informed trading and the sign
of AIV .
DAIVit = a+ b1Informedit + b2βMkt,it + b3Sizeit + b4BMit + b5IVAHXZ,it
+b6Illiquidityit + b7Accrualsit + b8AQit + b9Analystit + b10FDispit + b11FErrit
+b12MissingAnalyst,it + εit+1,
where DAIV is a dummy variable of abnormal idiosyncratic volatility (AIV ); it takes value of one
if AIV is greater than zero, and zero otherwise. In Panel A, Informed is one of the informed
RunUp variables from SUESign × RunUp, SUESign × RunUpSign, SUESignFC × RunUp, or
SUESignFC×RunUpSign. In Panel B, Informed is one of the informed informed trading variables
from abnormal insider trading (AIT ), abnormal short selling (ASS), or abnormal institutional trad-
ing (AIN). The (untabulated) control variables are abnormal trading volume (AV ol), market beta
(βMkt), market capitalization (Size), book-to-market ratio (BM), AHXZ’s idiosyncratic volatility
(IVAHXZ), Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity (Illiquidity), accruals (Accruals), earnings quality (AQ),
number of analysts following (Analyst), analyst dispersion (FDisp), analyst forecast errors (FErr),
and missing analyst indicator (MissingAnalyst). The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based
on Huber-White standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. R̄2 is adjusted R2. Intercept and
year fixed effects are not tabulated. The sample periods are 1972-2015 for models with SUESign,
1983–2015 for models with SUESignFC , 1996–2015 for models with AIT , 2007–2015 for models
with ASS, and 1999–2015 for models with AIN .
Panel A: Informed RunUp and AIV





SUESignFC ×RunUp 1.540 1.648
(12.63) (12.78)
SUESignFC ×RunUpSign 0.065 0.070
(8.01) (8.18)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
R̄2 1.3% 1.5% 1.1% 1.3% 1.5% 1.7% 1.4% 1.6%
Firms 2,893 2,626 2,893 2,626 2,193 2,002 2,224 2,002
Observations 127,272 115,542 127,272 115,542 72,382 66,078 73,382 66,078
Panel B: Informed trading and AIV
Variable M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8
AIT 0.016 0.035 0.760 0.546
(1.09) (2.01) (2.80) (2.53)
ASS 0.197 0.106 0.141 -0.004
(4.91) (2.51) (1.26) (-0.04)
AIN 1.322 0.833 2.381 1.741
(11.24) (7.84) (6.62) (4.53)
AV OL 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003
(10.71) (19.97) (22.71) (7.91)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
R̄2 1.0% 4.1% 1.1% 4.6% 1.9% 5.2% 2.7% 7.5%
Firms 432 394 2,886 2,421 1,752 1,591 305 280
Observations 8,633 7,889 25,972 21,791 29,776 27,039 2,743 2,52250
Table 5
Relations with quantity-based information risk measures
This table presents panel regression of the abnormal idiosyncratic volatility (AIV ) on measures of
quantity-based information risk variables with control variables and year fixed effects in the following
model.
AIVit = a+ b1PINit + b2βMkt,it + b3Sizeit + b4BMit + b5IVAHXZ,it
+b6Illiquidityit + b7Accrualsit + b8AQit + b9Analystit + b10FDispit + b11FErrit
+b12MissingAnalyst,it + εit+1,
where AIV is abnormal idiosyncratic volatility. PIN is Easley and O’Hara’s PIN (PINEHO), Duarte
and Young’s PIN (PINDY ), Duarte and Young’s PSOS (PSOS), abnormal trading volume (AV ol),
abnormal turnover (ATurn), or abnormal effective spread (ASpread). The control variables are
market beta (βMkt), market capitalization (Size), book-to-market ratio (BM), AHXZ’s idiosyncratic
volatility (IVAHXZ), Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity (Illiquidity), accruals (Accruals), earnings quality
(AQ), number of analysts following (Analyst), analyst dispersion (FDisp), analyst forecast errors
(FErr), and missing analyst indicator (MissingAnalyst). The AIV is multiplied by 100 to scale up
the coefficients. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors adjusted
for heteroskedasticity and clustered at both the firm and year level. R̄2 is adjusted R2. Intercept
and year fixed effects are not tabulated. The sample period varies according to the availability of
quantitative-based information risk variables.













βMkt 1.831 1.814 1.874 0.522 -0.497 1.282
(1.59) (2.02) (2.10) (1.09) (-1.05) (1.81)
Size -0.247 0.453 0.567 -0.471 -0.141 0.277
(-0.50) (1.05) (1.39) (-3.50) (-1.04) (0.82)
BM -0.342 -0.578 -0.527 0.101 0.449 -0.445
(-0.83) (-1.72) (-1.55) (0.57) (2.89) (-1.51)
IVAHXZ -2.975 -2.097 -2.073 -6.327 -4.493 -4.785
(-1.74) (-1.61) (-1.59) (-5.77) (-4.93) (-2.73)
Illiquidity 0.001 0.051 0.035 0.011 0.007 0.099
(0.03) (1.28) (0.88) (1.22) (0.93) (2.36)
Accruals 37.599 30.704 30.846 14.493 9.964 23.707
(3.68) (3.30) (3.34) (3.74) (3.00) (2.77)
AQ 2.331 2.660 2.410 -1.375 -2.660 -1.282
(0.55) (0.69) (0.61) (-0.52) (-1.07) (-0.33)
Analyst 0.278 0.305 0.362 0.515 0.193 0.366
(0.63) (0.70) (0.85) (2.25) (0.69) (0.96)
FDisp -0.128 0.214 0.232 -0.199 -0.169 0.249
(-0.22) (0.42) (0.46) (-1.13) (-0.95) (0.73)
FErr 0.068 0.043 0.035 0.087 0.065 -0.044
(0.26) (0.17) (0.14) (0.86) (0.59) (-0.25)
MissingAnalyst -0.752 -0.770 -0.942 -1.520 -1.392 -0.783
(-0.88) (-1.07) (-1.29) (-3.42) (-3.21) (-1.16)
R̄2 1.6% 2.2% 2.2% 5.3% 1.3% 2.7%
Firms 1,499 1,476 1,476 2,660 2,660 1,456
Observations 22,483 32,469 32,469 117,043 117,043 45,122
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Table 6
Monthly excess returns and risk-adjusted portfolio alphas of AIV portfolios
This table reports equally weighted average monthly excess returns (R) and Fama-French-Carhart
four-factor risk-adjusted portfolio alphas (RAdj) of stock portfolios sorted on the abnormal idiosyn-
cratic volatility (AIV ). Panel A shows R and RAdj of single-sorted portfolios formed monthly on
prior-month AIV . Panel B shows RAdj of double-sorted portfolios sorted monthly first by prior June
market capitalization (Size) and then by prior-month AIV . Panel C shows equally weighted average
future monthly excess returns (R) of stock portfolios sorted on the abnormal idiosyncratic volatility
(AIV ). The future values R in 2 months, 3 months, 6 months, 9 months, 12 months, 18 months,
and 24 months are reported. The differences in R and RAdj between the high and the low portfolios
are also reported, along with t-statistics in parentheses. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are
based on Newey-West standard errors. The sample period is from July 1972 to December 2015.
Panel A: Single-sorted Panel B: Double-sorted portfolios
portfolios sort by Size, then AIV
Portfolios R RAdj Small Size 2 3 4 Large Size
Low AIV 0.999 -0.146 -0.319 -0.204 -0.170 0.013 0.060
2 1.124 -0.005 -0.057 -0.115 -0.082 0.060 0.082
3 1.151 0.008 -0.037 -0.045 -0.063 0.010 0.134
4 1.136 -0.025 -0.100 -0.210 0.037 0.023 0.056
High AIV 1.137 0.012 0.021 -0.108 0.011 0.150 0.081
High-Low 0.138 0.158 0.34 0.096 0.181 0.137 0.021
(3.19) (3.45) (4.09) (1.20) (2.37) (1.89) (0.31)
Panel C: Month-by-month portfolio returns
Portfolios Rt+2 Rt+3 Rt+6 Rt+9 Rt+12 Rt+18 Rt+24
Low AIV 1.030 1.079 1.136 1.153 1.183 1.280 1.291
2 1.137 1.153 1.135 1.147 1.210 1.229 1.258
3 1.140 1.138 1.171 1.192 1.271 1.239 1.274
4 1.162 1.141 1.125 1.199 1.231 1.299 1.299
High AIV 1.146 1.142 1.198 1.193 1.241 1.340 1.340
High-Low 0.116 0.063 0.062 0.040 0.058 0.059 0.049
(2.47) (1.38) (1.37) (0.87) (1.26) (1.27) (1.07)
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Table 7
The effect of AIV on cross-sectional expected stock returns
This table shows Fama-MacBeth monthly cross-sectional returns and panel long-term cross-sectional cumulative re-
turns results for the following model.
Ri,t+1 = a+ b1AIVit + b2Controlit + εi,t+1,
Ri,[t+1,t+m]/m = a+ b1AIVit + b2Controlit + εi,t+1,
where Ri,t+1 is the monthly stock excess return of firm i at time t+ 1, Ri,[t+1,t+m]/m is the average monthly stock
excess return of firm i over the next m months, and AIV is abnormal idiosyncratic volatility. The control variables
are as follows. βMkt is market beta, Size is market capitalization, BM is book-to-market ratio, IVAHXZ is AHXZ’s
idiosyncratic volatility, Illiquidity is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity, R−1 is past one-month stock return, R[−3,−2] is past
two-month stock returns, R[−6,−4] is past three-month stock returns, and R[−12,−7] is past six-month stock returns.
In Panel A, the Fama-MacBeth regression is used. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on Newey-West
standard errors. M1–M2 examine a sample period from July 1972 to December 2015, M3–M4 examine a sample period
from July 1972 to December 1993, and M5–M6 examine a sample period from January 1994 to December 2015. The
panel presents time-series averages of the estimated slope coefficients from the above regression. R̄2 is the time-series
average of adjusted R2 in the cross-sectional regression, and Firms denotes the time-series average of the number of
firms in the cross-sectional regression. In Panel B, the panel regression with month fixed effect is used. The t-statistics
reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at both the
firm and month level. Month fixed effects and intercept are not tabulated. R̄2 is adjusted R2, and Firms denotes the
time-series average of the number of firms in the cross-sectional regression. The sample period is from July 1972 to
December 2015.
Panel A: Monthly cross-sectional returns using Fama-MacBeth regression
full Sample 1972–1993 1994–2015
Variable M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
AIV 0.149 0.176 0.101 0.153 0.196 0.198
(4.38) (4.61) (2.22) (2.83) (3.94) (3.68)
βMkt -0.092 0.061 -0.305 -0.083 0.116 0.201
(-0.35) (0.29) (-0.97) (-0.30) (0.28) (0.64)
Size 0.012 -0.041 -0.019 -0.051 0.042 -0.032
(0.34) (-1.43) (-0.39) (-1.21) (0.86) (-0.81)
BM 0.304 0.283 0.386 0.401 0.225 0.167
(4.60) (4.54) (4.25) (4.34) (2.36) (2.06)
IVAHXZ -1.609 -1.544 -1.672
(-8.12) (-6.10) (-5.49)
Illiquidity 0.015 0.015 0.015
(4.17) (2.42) (3.88)
R−1 -5.436 -7.816 -3.110
(-11.21) (-11.07) (-5.90)
R[−3,−2] 0.263 0.075 0.446
(1.03) (0.22) (1.17)
R[−6,−4] 0.613 0.781 0.449
(2.43) (2.23) (1.24)
R[−12,−7] 0.913 1.421 0.417
(5.38) (6.19) (1.78)
Intercept 0.828 1.199 1.176 1.335 0.489 1.066
(2.96) (4.36) (3.44) (4.31) (1.12) (2.36)
R̄2 3.6% 6.4% 3.9% 7.0% 3.2% 5.9%
Firms 2,965 2,772 2,480 2,195 3,439 3,337
Observations 1,547,696 1,447,235 639,776 566,278 907,920 880,957
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Table 7-continued
Panel B: Long-term cumulative cross-sectional returns using panel regression
Rt,t+1/2 Rt,t+3/3 Rt,t+6/6 Rt,t+9/9 Rt,t+12/12 Rt,t+18/18 Rt,t+24/24
Variable M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7
AIV 0.154 0.135 0.104 0.100 0.091 0.086 0.083
(3.19) (3.15) (3.08) (3.29) (3.27) (3.57) (3.94)
βMkt 0.080 0.070 0.067 0.045 0.051 0.068 0.072
(0.45) (0.47) (0.63) (0.52) (0.68) (1.13) (1.42)
Size 0.019 0.020 0.014 0.011 0.013 0.017 0.017
(0.71) (0.94) (0.93) (0.88) (1.17) (1.93) (2.12)
BM 0.334 0.321 0.304 0.289 0.273 0.260 0.234
(5.84) (6.77) (8.43) (9.90) (10.86) (12.10) (12.28)
IVAHXZ -0.418 -0.373 -0.334 -0.302 -0.300 -0.249 -0.275
(-0.99) (-1.25) (-1.94) (-2.17) (-2.60) (-2.93) (-4.27)
Illiquidity 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001
(2.29) (2.72) (3.21) (2.91) (2.50) (1.67) (1.44)
R−1 -2.114 -1.165 -0.362 -0.039 0.154 -0.057 -0.012
(-2.86) (-2.12) (-1.46) (-0.18) (0.87) (-0.44) (-0.12)
R[−3,−2] 0.365 0.296 0.501 0.389 0.332 0.060 0.040
(0.73) (1.01) (2.79) (2.16) (2.24) (0.57) (0.49)
R[−6,−4] 0.596 0.682 0.456 0.392 0.132 -0.022 -0.068
(1.90) (2.81) (3.05) (2.72) (1.20) (-0.27) (-1.01)
R[−12,−7] 0.430 0.280 0.009 -0.172 -0.214 -0.172 -0.208
(1.76) (1.19) (0.07) (-1.96) (-2.72) (-3.16) (-4.05)
R̄2 19.3% 19.8% 18.9% 17.2% 16.0% 14.7% 12.8%
Firms 2,772 2,772 2,772 2,772 2,772 2,772 2,772
Observations 1,447,235 1,447,235 1,447,235 1,447,235 1,447,235 1,447,235 1,447,235
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Table 8
AIV with corporate news events
This table shows Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression results for the following model.
Ri,t+1 = a+ b1AIVNews,it + b2Controlit + εi,t+1,
where Ri,t+1 is the monthly stock excess return of firm i at time t + 1, and AIVNews is abnormal
idiosyncratic volatility estimated using firm-specific news events. The control variables are as follows.
βMkt is market beta, Size is market capitalization, BM is book-to-market ratio, IVAHXZ is AHXZ’s
idiosyncratic volatility, Illiquidity is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity, R−1 is past one-month stock return,
R[−3,−2] is past two-month stock returns, R[−6,−4] is past three-month stock returns, and R[−12,−7]
is past six-month stock returns. In M1, the baseline result using AIV with sample period similar
to those of AIVNews is presented. In M2, news that have negative and positive event sentiment
with ESS score smaller than 40 or greater than 60 are used in estimating pre-news idiosyncratic
volatility part of AIVNews. In M3, news that have negative and positive event sentiment with ESS
score smaller than 45 or greater than 55 are used in estimating pre-news idiosyncratic volatility
part of AIVNews. In M4, all news events are used in estimating pre-news idiosyncratic volatility
part of AIVNews. All news events are used in estimating non-news idiosyncratic volatility part
of AIVNews. In all cases, earning announcements is used in estimating pre-news and non-news
idiosyncratic volatility part of AIVNews. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on Newey-
West standard errors. The table presents time-series averages of the estimated slope coefficients from
the above regression. R̄2 is the time-series average of adjusted R2 in the cross-sectional regression,
and Firms denotes the time-series average of the number of firms in the cross-sectional regression.
The sample period is from January 2001 to December 2015.
Negative and positive news
Baseline ESS < 40 or ESS > 60 ESS < 45 or ESS > 55 All news
Variable M1 M2 M3 M4
AIVNews 0.160 0.162 0.218 0.199
(2.92) (2.43) (3.45) (3.21)
βMkt 0.049 0.064 0.062 0.063
(0.12) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Size -0.091 -0.091 -0.092 -0.092
(-2.25) (-2.18) (-2.20) (-2.21)
BM 0.145 0.157 0.157 0.157
(1.79) (1.94) (1.94) (1.94)
IVAHXZ -1.889 -1.943 -1.945 -1.947
(-5.72) (-5.90) (-5.90) (-5.91)
Illiquidity 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
(2.09) (2.22) (2.23) (2.22)
R−1 -2.606 -2.622 -2.622 -2.620
(-3.81) (-3.82) (-3.82) (-3.81)
R[−3,−2] -0.003 0.023 0.024 0.023
(-0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
R[−6,−4] -0.089 -0.104 -0.107 -0.107
(-0.18) (-0.21) (-0.22) (-0.22)
R[−12,−7] 0.173 0.148 0.148 0.149
(0.55) (0.47) (0.47) (0.48)
Intercept 1.647 1.645 1.650 1.650
(2.97) (2.94) (2.95) (2.95)
R̄2 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058
Firms 3,126 3,002 3,002 3,002
Observations 562,712 540,292 540,307 540,310
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Table 9
AIV and the post-earnings announcement drift
This table provides Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of future one-month return, Ri,t+1 on
on AIVit, pre-announcement return run-up (RunUp), earnings surprises (SUE), and AIV adjusted
for the pre-announcement return run-up and surprise (AIVAdj), along with other control variables.
Ri,t+1 = a+ b1AIVit + b2PEADit + b3Controlit + εi,t+1,
Ri,t+1 = a+ b1AIVadj,it + Controlit + εi,t+1,
where Ri,t+1 is the monthly stock excess return of firm i at time t+1, AIV is abnormal idiosyncratic
volatility, AIVadj = AIV/|CAR(d1, d2)| where CAR(d1, d2) is the cumulative abnormal return over
the (d + d1, d + d2) period, d refers to announcement day, and d1 and d2 are measured in days.
PEAD is the expected post-earnings announcement drift, proxied by the pre-announcement return
run-up, or SUE or their combination, The control variables are as follows. βMkt is market beta, Size
is market capitalization, BM is book-to-market ratio, IVAHXZ is AHXZ’s idiosyncratic volatility,
Illiquidity is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity, R−1 is past one-month stock return, R[−3,−2] is past two-
month stock returns, R[−6,−4] is past three-month stock returns, and R[−12,−7] is past six-month
stock returns. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on Newey-West standard errors.
The table presents time-series averages of the estimated slope coefficients from the above regression.
R̄2 is the time-series average of adjusted R2 in the cross-sectional regression, and Firms denotes the
time-series average of the number of firms in the cross-sectional regression. The sample period is
from July 1972 to December 2015.







Variable M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7






AIVAdj 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004
(3.90) (5.24) (3.90) (5.24)
βMkt 0.049 0.075 0.055 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059
(0.24) (0.36) (0.26) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
Size -0.039 -0.046 -0.045 -0.041 -0.042 -0.041 -0.042
(-1.34) (-1.60) (-1.55) (-1.42) (-1.44) (-1.42) (-1.44)
BM 0.285 0.276 0.276 0.284 0.284 0.284 0.284
(4.57) (4.39) (4.41) (4.55) (4.55) (4.55) (4.55)
IVAHXZ -1.607 -1.448 -1.449 -1.605 -1.605 -1.605 -1.605
(-8.14) (-7.26) (-7.26) (-8.10) (-8.11) (-8.10) (-8.11)
Illiquidity 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
(4.01) (3.48) (3.41) (4.16) (4.13) (4.16) (4.13)
R−1 -5.694 -5.753 -5.949 -5.431 -5.428 -5.431 -5.428
(-11.59) (-11.47) (-11.84) (-11.19) (-11.19) (-11.19) (-11.19)
R[−3,−2] -0.009 0.019 -0.204 0.262 0.261 0.262 0.261
(-0.03) (0.07) (-0.77) (1.03) (1.03) (1.03) (1.03)
R[−6,−4] 0.548 0.380 0.333 0.610 0.610 0.610 0.610
(2.17) (1.51) (1.32) (2.42) (2.42) (2.42) (2.42)
R[−12,−7] 0.897 0.743 0.736 0.913 0.912 0.913 0.912
(5.31) (4.55) (4.53) (5.38) (5.37) (5.38) (5.37)
Intercept 1.207 1.173 1.200 1.202 1.206 1.202 1.206
(4.40) (4.15) (4.30) (4.37) (4.40) (4.37) (4.40)
R̄2 6.5% 6.7% 6.8% 6.4% 6.4% 6.4% 6.4%
Firms 2,772 2,700 2,700 2,772 2,772 2,772 2,772
Observations 1,446,837 1,406,623 1,406,527 1,446,734 1,446,734 1,446,734 1,446,734
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Table 10
The idiosyncratic volatility anomaly
Panel A of this table shows RAdj of double-sorted portfolios sorted monthly first by prior-month
AHXZ’s idiosyncratic volatility (IVAHXZ) and then by prior-month AIV . Panel B shows RAdj
of double-sorted portfolios sorted monthly first by prior-month non-earnings-announcement idiosyn-
cratic volatility (IVNEA) and then by prior-month pre-earnings-announcement idiosyncratic volatility
(IVPEA). The differences in RAdj between the high and the low portfolios are also reported along
with t-statistics in parentheses. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on Newey-West
standard errors. Panel C shows Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression results for the following
model.
Ri,t+1 = a+ b1IVPEA,it + b2IVNEA,it + b3Controlit + εi,t+1,
where Ri,t+1 is the monthly stock excess return of firm i at time t + 1, IVPEA is pre-earnings-
announcement idiosyncratic volatility, and IVNEA is non-earnings-announcement idiosyncratic
volatility. The control variables are as follows. βMkt is market beta, Size is market capitalization,
BM is book-to-market ratio, IVAHXZ is AHXZ’s idiosyncratic volatility, Illiquidity is Amihud’s
(2002) illiquidity, R−1 is past one-month stock return, R[−3,−2] is past two-month stock returns,
R[−6,−4] is past three-month stock returns, and R[−12,−7] is past six-month stock returns. The t-
statistics reported in parentheses are based on Newey-West standard errors. M4 examines the effect
of AIV that is orthogonal to the IVAHXZ (AIVOrth) on cross-sectional expected stock returns. The
table presents time-series averages of the estimated slope coefficients from the above regression. R̄2
is the time-series average of adjusted R2 in the cross-sectional regression, and Firms denotes the
time-series average of the number of firms in the cross-sectional regression. The sample period is
from July 1972 to December 2015.
Panel A: Double-sorted portfolios, sort by IVAHXZ , then AIV
Portfolios Low IVAHXZ 2 3 4 High IVAHXZ
Low AIV 0.069 0.005 0.106 -0.107 -0.869
2 0.113 0.184 0.102 0.108 -0.576
3 0.068 0.193 0.226 0.184 -0.585
4 0.075 0.214 0.268 -0.039 -0.682
High AIV 0.147 0.174 0.256 0.121 -0.531
High-Low 0.077 0.169*** 0.150** 0.228** 0.338***
(1.51) (2.80) (2.10) (2.25) (3.52)
Panel B: Double-sorted portfolios, sort by IVNEA, then IVPEA
Portfolios Low IVNEA 2 3 4 High IVNEA
Low IVPEA 0.135 0.074 -0.050 -0.097 -0.401
2 0.209 0.173 0.057 0.114 -0.389
3 0.140 0.098 0.131 -0.012 -0.433
4 0.157 0.118 0.140 -0.160 -0.573
High IVPEA 0.161 0.169 0.135 -0.055 -0.622
High-Low 0.026 0.095 0.185** 0.042 -0.221
-0.36 (1.64) (2.22) (0.43) (-1.41)
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Table 10-continued
Panel C: Regression approach







βMkt 0.064 0.147 0.138 0.061
(0.35) (0.89) (0.84) (0.29)
Size -0.040 -0.059 -0.058 -0.041
(-1.38) (-1.97) (-1.93) (-1.43)
BM 0.283 0.267 0.267 0.283
(4.62) (4.44) (4.45) (4.54)
IVAHXZ -1.530 -1.319 -1.340 -1.604
(-9.98) (-10.70) (-10.99) (-8.09)
Illiquidity 0.015 0.017 0.017 0.015
(4.12) (4.64) (4.61) (4.17)
R−1 -5.469 -5.533 -5.537 -5.436
(-11.33) (-11.53) (-11.52) (-11.21)
R[−3,−2] 0.264 0.283 0.282 0.263
(1.04) (1.11) (1.11) (1.03)
R[−6,−4] 0.647 0.703 0.706 0.613
(2.63) (2.91) (2.93) (2.43)
R[−12,−7] 0.921 0.931 0.932 0.913
(5.63) (5.85) (5.87) (5.38)
Intercept 1.130 0.794 0.831 1.198
(4.25) (2.67) (2.75) (4.36)
R̄2 6.6% 6.8% 6.9% 6.4%
Firms 2,772 2,772 2,772 2,772
Observations 1,447,235 1,447,235 1,447,235 1,447,235
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Table 11
Quantity-based information risk measures
This table provides Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression results with quantity-based information
risk variables that include Easley and O’Hara’s PIN (PINEHO), Duarte and Young’s PIN (PINDY ),
Duarte and Young’s PSOS (PSOS), abnormal trading volume (AV ol), abnormal turnover (ATurn),
and abnormal effective spread (ASpread) over the following baseline model.
Ri,t+1 = a+ b1AIVit + b2PINit + b3Controlit + εi,t+1,
where Ri,t+1 is the monthly stock excess return of firm i at time t + 1, and AIV is abnormal
idiosyncratic volatility. The control variables are as follows. βMkt is market beta, Size is market
capitalization, BM is book-to-market ratio, IVAHXZ is AHXZ’s idiosyncratic volatility, Illiquidity
is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity, R−1 is past one-month stock return, R[−3,−2] is past two-month stock
returns, R[−6,−4] is past three-month stock returns, and R[−12,−7] is past six-month stock returns.
The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on Newey-West standard errors. The table presents
time-series averages of the estimated slope coefficients from the above regression. R̄2 is the time-
series average of adjusted R2 in the cross-sectional regression, and Firms denotes the time-series
average of the number of firms in the cross-sectional regression. The sample period varies according
to the availability of quantity-based information risk variables.
Variable M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7
AIV 0.189 0.249 0.253 0.251 0.184 0.133 0.196













βMkt -0.234 -0.026 -0.024 -0.020 0.062 0.051 -0.025
(-0.79) (-0.10) (-0.09) (-0.08) (0.30) (0.25) (-0.11)
Size 0.039 0.029 0.014 0.031 -0.040 -0.042 -0.003
(0.99) (0.75) (0.38) (0.80) (-1.38) (-1.46) (-0.11)
BM 0.233 0.223 0.220 0.220 0.283 0.285 0.190
(2.90) (3.07) (3.07) (3.07) (4.56) (4.58) (3.32)
IVAHXZ -1.818 -1.407 -1.458 -1.396 -1.607 -1.605 -1.767
(-5.14) (-4.33) (-4.41) (-4.29) (-8.13) (-8.10) (-6.46)
Illiquidity 0.019 0.019 0.021 0.019 0.015 0.015 0.043
(1.96) (2.02) (2.14) (1.94) (4.23) (4.18) (3.52)
R−1 -4.113 -3.755 -3.773 -3.784 -5.434 -5.439 -3.035
(-6.67) (-7.22) (-7.26) (-7.27) (-11.20) (-11.21) (-6.35)
R[−3,−2] 0.350 0.389 0.374 0.369 0.261 0.261 0.338
(0.89) (1.13) (1.08) (1.07) (1.03) (1.03) (1.07)
R[−6,−4] 0.640 0.798 0.802 0.794 0.608 0.606 0.274
(1.52) (2.48) (2.50) (2.47) (2.41) (2.41) (0.80)
R[−12,−7] 1.227 0.895 0.914 0.901 0.914 0.911 0.670
(6.02) (4.27) (4.37) (4.34) (5.39) (5.38) (3.18)
Intercept 0.962 0.699 0.933 0.688 1.190 1.212 1.056
(2.56) (1.81) (2.26) (1.61) (4.38) (4.43) (3.45)
R̄2 6.0% 6.5% 6.5% 6.5% 6.5% 6.5% 0.065
Firms 1,470 1,460 1,460 1,460 2,772 2,772 1,477
Observations 264,566 385,532 385,532 385,532 1,447,223 1,447,223 565,778
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Table 12
AIV with additional risk or mispricing variables
This table repeats Fama-MacBeth regression in M2 of Table 6 with additional variables in the following model.
Ri,t+1 = a+ b1AIVit + b2Turnoverit + b3Shortit + b4MissingShort,it + b5Analystit
+b6FDispit + b7FErrit + b8MissingAnalyst,it + b9CapExit + b10GPAit
+b11Oscoreit + b12Accrualsit + b13AQit + b14Controlit + εi,t+1,
where Ri,t+1 is the monthly stock excess return of firm i at time t + 1, AIV is abnormal idiosyncratic volatility,
Turnover is past one year stock turnover, Short is past one month short interest ratio, MissingShort is missing
short interest ratio indicator, Analyst is number of analysts following, FDisp is analyst dispersion, FErr is analyst
forecast errors, MissingAnalyst is missing analyst indicator, CapEx is investment, GPA is gross profitability, Oscore
is Ohlson’s (1980) distress score, Accruals is accruals, and AQ is earnings quality. All other control variables are
defined in Appendix. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on Newey-West standard errors. The table
presents time-series averages of the estimated slope coefficients from the above regression. R̄2 is the time-series average
of adjusted R2 in the cross-sectional regression, and Firms denotes the time-series average of the number of firms in
the cross-sectional regression. The sample period is from May 1998 to December 2015 for M2, from January 1983 to
December 2015 for M3, and from July 1972 to December 2015 for all other models.
Variable M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
AIV 0.165 0.154 0.179 0.138 0.170 0.120

























βMkt 0.206 0.225 -0.048 0.038 0.042 0.106
(1.10) (0.62) (-0.21) (0.18) (0.21) (0.61)
Size -0.018 -0.017 -0.112 -0.051 -0.073 -0.119
(-0.64) (-0.37) (-3.11) (-1.82) (-2.58) (-3.87)
BM 0.257 0.102 0.212 0.242 0.207 0.160
(4.32) (1.14) (3.29) (3.77) (3.27) (2.61)
IVAHXZ -1.387 -1.680 -1.722 -1.461 -1.472 -1.182
(-7.78) (-4.89) (-7.82) (-7.86) (-7.61) (-7.24)
Illiquidity 0.011 0.012 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.012
(3.13) (2.75) (4.53) (4.08) (4.42) (3.50)
R−1 -5.515 -2.684 -3.835 -5.549 -5.480 -5.723
(-11.46 (-4.36) (-8.94) (-11.33 (-11.57 (-12.13
R[−3,−2] 0.312 0.296 0.388 0.171 0.214 0.199
(1.26) (0.66) (1.37) (0.68) (0.78) (0.75)
R[−6,−4] 0.687 0.254 0.510 0.576 0.680 0.710
(2.75) (0.59) (1.87) (2.34) (2.59) (2.81)
R[−12,−7] 0.988 0.303 0.724 0.774 0.832 0.841
(5.90) (1.07) (4.21) (4.67) (4.89) (5.25)
Intercept 0.993 0.840 1.438 1.142 1.509 1.353
(3.99) (1.44) (4.34) (4.22) (5.43) (5.06)
R̄2 6.9% 6.7% 5.8% 6.8% 6.6% 7.7%
Firms 2,772 3,264 3,156 2,466 2,417 2,270
Observations 1,447,212 692,051 1,230,802 1,287,497 1,261,774 1,185,161
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Fig. 1.
Price variation and stock turnover around earnings announcements
These figures display average absolute residual return (at) for day t ∈ [−10, 10] around earnings
announcements, calculated as the average of daily absolute FF-3 model residuals of day t. Fig. (a)
further displays average annualized stock turnover around earnings announcements, calculated as the
number of shares traded deflated by number of shares outstanding then multiple by 252. Fig. (b)
displays for the large and small quintile stock portfolios sorted by abnormal insider trading (AIT ).
Fig. (c) displays for the large and small quintile stock portfolios sorted by abnormal insider trading
(AIT ). Fig. (d) displays for the large and small quintile stock portfolios sorted by abnormal insider
trading (AIT ). The sample period is from July 1972 to December 2015.
(a) Price variation and stock turnover (b) Large and small AIT stocks
(c) Large and small ASS stocks (d) Large and small AIN stocks
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